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Issue I: Is there a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether 
Dr. Watts' failure to consult the primary care physician was a proximate 
cause of the injury she suffered from the surgery performed by Dr. Kohler? 
Supporting Authority: Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
Kilpatrick v.Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P. 2d 1283 (Utah 1996) 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P. 2d 634 (Utah 
1989) 
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Gerald V. Blomquist 
773 P. 2d 1382 (Utah 1989) 
Payne v. Garth G. Myers, M.D. 743 P. 2d 186, 187 (Utah 1987) 
Standard of Review: A grant of summary judgment is appropriate 
only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In considering an appeal from a 
grant of summary judgment, the appellate court views the facts in a light 
most favorable to the losing party below. In determining whether those facts 
require, as a matter of law, the entry of judgment for the prevailing party 
below, the Appellate court gives no deference to the trial court's conclusions 
of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P. 2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989). 
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Issue II: Is there a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether 
Dr. Watts' delay in appropriate treatment of Ms. Johnson between Nov. 6, 
1998 and Nov. 9,1998 was a reasonably foreseeable cause of injury? 
Supporting Authority: The supporting authority is the same as for 
the first issue. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review is the same as for the 
first issue. 
Both issues are preserved for review pursuant to the trial court's Order 
Certifying Judgment as Final under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, dated November 7, 2003. (R. 857) 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS ON APPEAL 
This appeal turns upon the application of Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. This section provides: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ms. Johnson sued Gary Watts. M.D. on December 19, 2001 asserting 
two negligence claims against Dr. Watts. First, Dr. Watts, a radiologist and 
the nephew of Mrs. Johnson, was negligent when he failed to consult Ms. 
6 
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Johnson's primary care physician, Dr. Salisbury, at Mrs. Johnson's first visit 
in late October 1998. She had consulted Dr. Watts about chronic abdominal 
pain which Dr. Salisbury had previously investigated. Dr. Watts referred 
Mrs. Johnson to a surgeon, Dr. Kohler, who performed surgery on 
November 3, 1998, during which surgery Mrs. Johnson suffered an 
unrecognized bowel perforation. 
Second, Dr. Watts was negligent when he re-admitted Mrs. Johnson to 
the hospital and assumed care of Ms. Johnson between Nov. 6 and Nov. 9, 
1998 in the absence of Dr. Kohler. Mrs. Johnson claims that Dr. Watts 
should have consulted a surgeon immediately and this failure to do so 
caused additional damage to her. 
Dr. Watts moved for summary judgment on Jan. 29, 2003, claiming 
that Ms. Johnson failed to establish a prima facie case by failure to establish 
a causal link between any action of Watts and the injuries alleged. Plaintiff 
served her Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion together with the 
Affidavit of Darwood Hance, M.D. on Feb. 12, 2003. Dr. Watts filed his 
reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on Feb 21, 
2003. After hearing oral argument on June 16, 2003, the trial court granted 
summary judgment to Dr. Watts on July 22, 2003. The Order Certifying 
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Judgment as Final was entered Nov. 10, 2003. The Notice of Appeal was 
filed December 3, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Ms. Lucy Johnson was formerly Ms. Lucy MacLeod. For the 
purposes of this appellate brief, she will be named as Ms. Johnson. (R. 
414). 
2 In late October 1998, Ms. Johnson contacted her nephew Dr. Watts, 
and requested assistance in securing diagnosis and treatment for her 
complaints of stomach pain. (R.280). 
3 Dr. Watts is Board certified in radiology and provided medical 
services in radiology at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center 
("UVRMC") and elsewhere. (R. 280). 
4 On October 27, 1998, Dr. Watts arranged a surgical consultation for 
Ms. Johnson with Dr. Douglas Kohler, ("Dr. Kohler") a general 
surgeon. .Dr. Kohler determined that Mrs. Johnson needed to have 
surgery to remove her gallbladder. (R. 279), 
5 Dr. Kohler performed the surgery to remove her gall bladder on 
November 3, 1998, resulting in a perforation to her bowel. (R. 279). 
6 Mrs. Johnson was discharged from UVRMC on November 4, 1998. 
(R. 35) 
8 
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7 Ms. Johnson continued to experience abdominal pain in the days 
following the surgery. (R.245). 
8 She was subsequently readmitted to UVRMC by Dr. Watts on 
November 6, 1998. (R. 279). 
9 After Ms. Johnson was readmitted to the hospital, Dr. Watts provided 
all her medical care until Dr. Kohler, who was out of town, returned to 
UVRMC on November 9, 1998. (R. 279). 
10 Dr. Kohler found Ms. Johnson to have extensive abdominal wall 
cellulitis for which he re-operated, finding a perforation in her bowel. 
(R. 238). 
11 After the second surgery, Ms. Johnson remained in the hospital until 
November 24, 1998. (R. 279). 
12 The affidavit of Darwood Hance, M.D. ("Dr. Hance") was attached to 
plaintiffs Opposition Memorandum. Dr. Hance is a radiology expert 
and is board certified in radiology and nuclear medicine. (R. 236). 
13 In his affidavit, Dr. Hance stated that Dr. Watts breached the standard 
of care when he failed to consult plaintiffs primary care physician, 
Dr. Salisbury, and undertook to diagnose and refer plaintiff for 
treatment of abdominal pain. (R. 322). 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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14 In his affidavit, Dr. Hance stated that Dr. Watts' failure to consult Ms. 
Johnson's primary care physician, Dr. Salisbury, was negligent and 
resulted in a referral to a surgeon that would not have been made if 
plaintiffs primary care physician had been consulted. (R. 322). 
15 Dr. Hance stated in affidavit that Dr. Watts should have consulted a 
surgeon to report that Ms. Johnson was having abdominal pain when 
Dr. Watts readmitted her to the hospital on November 6, 1998. 
(R.321). 
16 Dr. Hance's affidavit stated that Dr. Watts' failure to consult a 
surgeon resulted in prolongation of Ms. Johnson's pain, increasing 
infection, additional complications and additional hospitalization. (R. 
321). 
17 Deposition of Richard G, Barton. M.D. that was attached to the 
Opposition Memorandum of Plaintiff was taken in Salt Lake City, 
Utah on February 3, 2003. (R. 320). Dr. Barton is a board-certified 
surgeon and was the expert for the other defendant in this case, Dr. 
Kohler. 
18 Dr. Barton stated that the appropriate treatment upon recognition of an 
intra-abdominal infection due to perforated bowel in plaintiffs 
circumstances is prompt surgical treatment. (R. 317). 
10 
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19 Dr. Barton stated that delaying surgery in Mrs. Johnson's case 
increased the severity of the infection. (R. 315) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. The party opposing a summary judgment motion is entitled to have the 
court survey the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to him. 
The trial court improperly granted defendant Dr. Watts' summary 
judgment on plaintiff Ms. Johnson's two claims. First, Ms. Johnson claimed 
that Dr. Watts' negligent failure to consult the plaintiffs primary care 
physician at her first visit was a proximate cause of her initial injury. Dr. 
Hance's affidavit stated that it was negligent for Dr. Watts to fail to consult 
Dr. Salisbury, Mrs. Johnson's primary care physician. Further, Dr. Hance 
stated that if Dr. Watts had consulted Dr. Salisbury, there would have been 
no need for surgery, which would have made referral to Dr. Kohler or any 
other surgeon unnecessary. Because it is reasonable to infer that Ms. 
Johnson would never have had a bowel perforation if she had not had 
surgery, there is evidence by which a jury could decide that Dr. Watts' 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
negligent failure to contact Dr. Salisbury was a proximate cause of Ms. 
Johnson's injury. 
Second, Ms. Johnson claimed that Dr. Watts' delay in consulting a 
< 
surgeon on and after Nov. 6 caused her additional injury. Dr. Hance's 
affidavit stated that Ms. Johnson's intra-abdominal infection continued and 
worsened after she first complained of abdominal pain to Dr. Watts on Nov. 
5, 1998. Dr. Hance further stated that Dr. Watts was negligent in failing to 
consult a surgeon when he re-admitted Ms. Johnson to the hospital on Nov. 
6, 1998. Moreover, Dr. Hance stated that because of this failure to consult a 
surgeon, Ms. Johnson suffered pain, increasing infection, additional 
complications and additional hospitalization, and incurred additional 
medical bills. 
Adding to Dr. Hance's testimony, Dr. Barton, a surgeon, stated that 
the appropriate treatment upon recognition of a bowel perforation in 
plaintiffs circumstances is prompt surgical treatment. It is reasonable to 
infer from Hance's and Barton's evidence that Ms. Johnson would have had 
prompt surgery for the perforated bowel and intra-abdominal infection if Dr. 
Watts had contacted a surgeon on November 6, as he should have done. 
Going further, such an inference leads to the conclusion that delaying the 
surgery from November 6 to November 9, when Dr. Kohler returned, 
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resulted in increasing infection, additional abdominal pain, a larger abscess, 
additional hospital bills, increased risk of complications and everything 
attendant upon a longer hospital stay. These additional damages were stated 
by Dr. Hance in his affidavit. Dr. Barton also stated that the delay in 
performing surgery resulted in increasing infection and increased risk of 
complications. Thus, there is evidence by which jury could reasonably 
decide that Dr. Watts' failure to consult a surgeon was a proximate cause of 
Ms. Johnson's additional injury. 
Evidence presented by plaintiffs expert and reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom created a genuine dispute of material facts regarding Dr. 
Watts' negligence enough to defeat summary judgment motion. Yet, the 
trial court not only failed to recognize the genuine dispute but also failed to 
fairly draw reasonable inferences from all the evidences in Ms. Johnson's 
favor. Accordingly, this court should correct the error and reverse the 
decision of the court below. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Facts and Inferences from the Facts Create a Genuine Issue of 
Material Fact Which Precludes Summary Judgment on the Issue of 
Causation 
Utah law mandates that "[i]n determining whether the trial court 
correctly found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, we review 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the losing party." Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Gerald V. 
Blomquist, 773 P. 2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989)(citing Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & 
H Insurance Co., 714 P. 2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis 
National Bank, 737 P. 2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 
701 P. 2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985); Harmon City, Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior, 907 
P. 2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1995); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 
233 (Utah 1993). In determining whether those facts require, as a matter of 
law, the entry of judgment for the prevailing party below, the appellate court 
gives no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law: those conclusions 
are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 
779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989); Atlas Corp., 737 P.2d at 229; Kimball v. 
Campbell, 699 P. 2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985); see also Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P. 2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
Negligence cases, such as the medical malpractice case at issue here, 
are particularly unfit for summary judgment. Utah law provides that 
"[ojrdinarily, the question of negligence is a question of fact for the jury. 
Thus, summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the most 
clear instances." Baczuk v. Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, 8 P.3d 
14 
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1037, 1039 (Utah 2000)(citing Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P. 2d 414, 415 (Utah 
1990). 
When the issue to be determined is that of causation, the requirements 
of summary judgment are perhaps even more restricted. Utah law has it that 
"[pjroximate cause is an issue of fact. Thus, only if there is no evidence 
upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation, is summary judgment 
appropriate." Kilpatrick v.Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P. 2d 1283, 1292 
(Utah 1996). 
The quantum of evidence to establish a dispute and preclude summary 
judgment is small. "It only takes one sworn statement under oath to dispute 
the averments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue of 
fact." Id.(citing Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993)). In this 
negligence case, there is much more than one sworn statement to establish a 
dispute on the issue of causation. 
B. There Is Evidence That Dr. Watts' Negligent Failure To Consult Ms. 
Johnson's Primary Care Physician Foreseeably Caused Her Injury. 
Mrs. Johnson claims that Dr. Watts failed to consult her primary care 
physician. If he had done so, she claims, Dr. Watts would not have referred 
her to Dr. Kohler or to any other surgeon. She would not have undergone 
surgery and would not have suffered the bowel perforation that occurred 
during surgery. Because there is evidence by which a jury could reasonably 
15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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infer that Dr. Watts' failure to consult Dr. Salisbury resulted in a surgery that 
otherwise would not have been performed, the grant of summary judgment 
was erroneous. 
i 
The trial court granted summary judgment because it found that 
"[b]ecause Dr. Watts' involvement with Ms. Johnson' care ended with his 
referral to an experienced surgeon, Dr. Kohler, there is no causal connection 
between any harm Ms. Johnson suffered from surgery and Dr. Watts' 
referral."(R.809). However, viewing the evidence in that manner turns the 
analysis logically inside out. The issue is not who decided to perform the 
surgery. The issue is whether Mrs. Johnson should have been referred to a 
surgeon in the first place. It is clearly foreseeable that once referral to a 
surgeon has been made, surgery may ensue. 
Although it may be that Dr. Watts did not make a decision to perform 
the surgery (R.328), this statement is only part of the whole picture. In his 
affidavit, Dr. Hance stated that "Dr. Watts breached the standard of care 
when he failed to consult plaintiffs primary care physician, Dr. Salisbury, 
before referring plaintiff to Dr. Kohler." He then stated that "if Dr. Watts 
had the information available from Dr. Salisbury, in my opinion there would 
have been no medical reason to refer plaintiff to Dr. Kohler or any other 
surgeon."(R.322). These are facts that the trial court should have viewed in 
16 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the light most favorable to plaintiff; i.e., as established facts. From these 
facts, it is reasonable to infer that if Watts had acted within the standard of 
care and had not referred Mrs. Johnson to Kohler or any other surgeon, she 
would not have had the surgery that indisputably injured her. Dr. Watts 
could foresee that Ms. Johnson, upon being referred to a surgeon, might be 
advised by that surgeon to have surgery. The issue is not the decision 
whether to have surgery. This issue is whether there should have been a 
surgical referral at all. 
Once the nonmoving party, the plaintiff Ms. Johnson, has presented 
evidence that Dr. Watts' negligent failure to consult the primary care 
physician was a cause of Ms. Johnson's injury, the trial court should have 
accepted this evidence as fact. Then, the trial court should have drawn all 
the reasonable inferences from that. Here, one of the reasonable inferences 
is that Ms. Johnson would not have sustained the initial injury if she had not 
had the referral to Kohler and further that the referral foreseeably resulted in 
surgery. 
Even without making reasonable inferences, Dr. Hance's affidavit has 
at least one sworn statement that establishes a causal link between Watts' 
negligence and Ms. Johnson's initial surgical injury. Hance directly states 
that "there would have been no medical reason to refer plaintiff to Dr. 
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Kohler . ..." and that "[t]he referral to Dr. Kohler led to the surgery 
performed by Kohler in which plaintiff was injured."(R.322). The trial court 
should have viewed these statements in the light most favorable to plaintiff, 
accepting the statements as fact. Having done so, the trial court would then 
have had before it the "one sworn statement" establishing a dispute and 
summary judgment would have been inappropriate. Moreover, the dispute 
was a causation issue where summary judgment is appropriate only i/there 
is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation; the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment thus becomes even more dubious. 
There is evidence directly stating that Mrs. Johnson's injury was 
caused by Watts' failure to consult Dr. Salisbury. There is also evidence 
from which a reasonable inference can be drawn to the same effect. Finally, 
the negligent consultation of Dr. Kohler was reasonably foreseeable cause of 
a surgical injury. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
decision. 
C. There Is Evidence That Dr Watts' Negligent Failure To Timely 
Consult A Surgeon On Re-Admitting Mrs. Johnson To The Hospital 
Caused Additional Injury. 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the second 
issue of causation in this case. Ms. Johnson claims that Dr. Watts' negligent 
failure to consult a surgeon when she was re-admitted to the hospital on 
18 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
November 6 caused additional injury and such additional injury would have 
been avoided with prompt and proper surgical consultation. Ms. Johnson 
presented evidence to establish this causal connection. The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that "[o]n a motion for summary judgment, a trial court 
should not weigh disputed evidence and its sole inquiry should be whether 
material issues of fact exist." Kilpatrick, 909 P. 2d at 1292(citing Draper 
City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P. 2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995). Again, the 
court in Kilpatrick stated that "it only takes one sworn statement under oath 
to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy and create an 
issue of fact." Id. Further, the court noted that the trial court should observe 
that "doubts about whether a nonmovant has established a genuine issue of 
material fact should be resolved in favor of permitting the party to go to the 
trial." Id.fciting Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97,107 ( Utah 1992)). 
The trial court granted summary judgment because the court could 
find no expert testimony establishing a causal link between "Dr. Watts' 
failure to consult with Dr. Kohler until November 9" and "specific 
complications." (R. 808) This conclusion misses the point. Dr. Watts was 
negligent in failing to consult any surgeon and Dr. Hance clearly so states. 
Whatever treatment was or was not given by Dr. Watts during the two and 
one-half day wait for Kohler to return to town was, according to Dr. Hance's 
19 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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affidavit, inappropriate and the two and one-half day wait for appropriate 
i 
treatment caused additional damage. "Because Dr. Watts failed to consult a 
surgeon in a timely fashion on and after November 6, 1998, plaintiff 
suffered pain and increasing infection for at least two and one-half days 
without appropriate treatment." (R. 321) 
Dr. Hance also makes a direct connection between the failure to 
consult a surgeon and "specific complications" in his deposition testimony. 
Dr. Hance was asked directly about this issue in his deposition and this 
deposition testimony was before the court. 
Question; Did you intend to render any opinions at trial, sir, with 
respect 
to any supposed delay in the performing of that second 
surgery? 
Answer: Only that the delay in making the diagnosis of the 
perforation and 
undertaking the second surgery resulted in this large 
abscess that 
she had. 
Question: Do you intend to testify that the supposed delay in doing 
the second surgery caused any of her problems in doing the 
second surgery between the time of that surgery and the 
present? 
Answer: It caused large abscess to form. In other words, normally if 
you have a perforated small bowel and it's promptly 
recognized and promptly operated on, you do not expect a 
large abscess to form, which she did have she went to 
surgery several days later. 
(R. 325)(emphasis added) 
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The testimony quoted above directly states that delay caused a "large 
abscess" to form. Directly asked whether such a "large abscess" would have 
formed had surgery been performed promptly, Dr. Hance replied in the 
negative. In other words, at the very least, a large abscess resulted from 
delay. Whether a "large abscess" constitutes "specific complications" is a 
question of fact for the jury to weigh. Even though the questioner appeared 
to ask what happened after the second surgery, Dr. Hance answers the 
question with respect to the delay in performing the second surgery. Clearly, 
Dr. Hance equates a "large abscess" to damage caused by delay in 
performing surgery. 
The trial court also based summary judgment on the finding that Dr. 
Watts' actions did not cause "any additional damages to the plaintiff not 
already remaining from the first surgery." In direct contradiction to that 
finding, Dr. Hance states in his affidavit that, as a result of Watts5 delay in 
contacting a surgeon, Mrs. Johnson "suffered additional complications and 
additional hospitalization" and "incurred additional hospital bills." (R. 321) 
Whether or not these are the type of "additional injuries" the court was 
looking for, this expert testimony clearly establishes their existence and the 
causal connection between delay and additional damages. It is for the jury to 
determine the significance of these "additional complications and additional 
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hospitalization" and "additional hospital bills." Although Dr. Hance makes 
no direct statement that the "appropriate treatment" which he states was 
lacking for two and one-half days was necessarily another operation, the 
clear inference from his statements is that the lack of "appropriate treatment" 
of whatever nature resulted in these additional injuries." 
In another section of his deposition, Dr. Hance answers the question 
"[d]o you think there would be any difference in the ultimate outcome 
whether the surgery had been done on the 6 or the 9 ?" with an affirmative 
answer. His statement again directly addresses the question of delay causing 
additional damages, in this case, the additional damages of large abscess, 
more scarring, fever and toxicity. "Yes. I think she would have had -not had 
the large abscess that had to be drained. She would have had much less 
scarring and- . . . fever and toxicity as a result of that." (R. 230, page 63, 
lines 21-25) 
The testimony of Dr. Barton, surgeon expert for defendant Dr. Kohler, 
was also before the trial court. Dr. Barton likewise directly addresses the 
question of a causal link between delay and additional damages. In answer to 
a question about whether Mrs. Johnson's infection increased in severity in 
the period between November 5 and November 9, Dr. Barton stated "yes, 
this probably would have gotten worse." (R. 316, p. 80, lines 12-25) Again, 
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once evidence establishes the existence of the fact of the increasing severity 
of infection, it is the jury's province to weight the significance of that 
increase in infection. 
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the moving party, 
the evidence of Dr. Hance and Dr. Barton establishes a dispute as to whether 
Watts' failure to consult a surgeon on readmission of Mrs. Johnson caused 
additional injury. Summary judgment is precluded by this dispute. 
The trial court also found that "[t]here is no evidence showing that 
surgery should have, would have been performed if Dr. Watts had contacted 
the surgeon earlier."(R. 808). Both Dr. Hance and Dr. Barton offered 
testimony that contradicts that assertion. 
In his testimony, Dr. Barton states that surgery should have been 
performed upon recognition of the perforated bowel. He states that the 
appropriate treatment upon recognition of a perforated bowel is prompt 
surgical treatment. (R.316, p.79, line 18). This was in answer to a question 
about the appropriate course to be taken by Dr. Kohler if he had examined 
Mrs. Johnson and found a perforated bowel. The question assumes, of 
course, that Dr. Kohler would have acted non-negligently in examining Ms. 
Johnson on November 5 and therefore would have found such a condition. 
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Dr. Barton accepts that assumption and opines that immediate surgery is the 
< 
only non-negligent course of action. R.316, p. 81, Line 13) 
Likewise, Dr. Hance's deposition testimony directly stated that 
i 
surgery should have been performed on readmission. In response to a 
question about the appropriate care if a general surgeon had been consulted 
on Ms. Johnson's readmission to the hospital, without any qualifiers as to 
whether or not a perforation was found by that surgeon, Dr. Hance states that 
"she would have been taken back to surgery and the perforation closed." (R. 
325, p. 42, line 8) These statements of Drs. Barton and Hance both directly 
contradict the trial courts' conclusion as to whether or not surgery would 
have been performed if Dr. Watts had acted non-negligently on readmission 
of Mrs. Johnson to the hospital. 
The court was called upon to determine if there was evidence 
presented that Dr. Watts' failure to consult a surgeon resulted in damage to 
Mrs. Johnson. The court concluded there was no such evidence and granted 
summary judgment. However, in direct affidavit statements and in 
inferences from deposition testimony, Dr. Hance and Dr. Barton both 
identified damages such as increased severity of infection, larger abscess, 
additional medical bills, additional hospitalization, additional pain, 
additional scarring, fever and toxicity and "additional complications." There 
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is a disputed issue of fact which should be submitted to the jury. The jury, 
not the court, should weight the significance of these additional damages. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant presented evidence to the trial court that Dr. Watts' 
failure to consult Ms. Johnson's primary care physician was a reasonably 
foreseeable cause of injury because his negligence caused a surgical referral 
that would not have happened in the absence of his negligence. Drawing the 
reasonable inference, the trial court should have recognized that without a 
surgical referral, there would have been no surgery and no injury. 
The Appellant also presented evidence that Dr. Watts5 failure to consult 
a surgeon on readmission of Mrs. Johnson to the hospital caused injury that 
was additional to that which she already had suffered. That additional injury, 
presented in the testimony of both Dr. Hance and Dr. Barton and by the 
affidavit of Dr. Hance, consisted at least of "additional complications", 
increased severity of infection, additional scarring, additional hospital bills, 
additional hospitalization, and a large abscess. The significance of these 
injuries is for the jury to weigh and summary judgment should not have been 
granted. 
The court below failed to look at all the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Ms. Johnson and failed to draw reasonable inferences from that 
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evidence. The trial court's conclusion that there is "no evidence of 
causation" is error and, as a conclusion of law, is given no deference by this 
appellate court. Therefore, this Court should correct the error of the trial 
court, and reverse the grant of summary judgment to Dr. Watts. 
DATED bw \\i»i 
Signed 
Clark Newhall 
Law Office of Clark Newhall MD JD 
Attorney for Appellant 
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LUCY 
GARY 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
UTAH COUNTY, 
JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WATTS, MD, et al, 
Defendant. 
DISTRICT - PROVO COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
) ORAL ARGUMENT, MOTIONS 
) Case 010400391 
) Judge Steven L. Hansen 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on June 16, 2003. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
counsel, the following proceedings were held: 
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
(June 16, 2003) 
THE JUDGE: Okay. In the, is it MacLeod versus 
Watts? Did I say that correctly? 
MR. NEWHALL: Actually, Your Honor, her name has 
been changed to Lucy Johnson and I think we've submitted a 
motion some time back. And I don't believe there's any 
argument about changing the caption to read Johnson versus 
Watts. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Fine. All right. Everyone 
that's going to be appearing arguing, state your names for 
the record and who you represent. 
MR. NEWHALL: Clark Hewhall, MD, JD for the record 
for the plaintiff. 
MR. FISHER: Philip Fishier for Dr. Kohler. 
MR. DUBOIS: Scott DuBois for Dr. Watts. 
THE JUDGE: All right. We have an oral argument 
scheduled on the plaintiff's motion for arbitration, 
plaintiff's motion to limit experts, plaintiff's motion to 
videotape trial depositions, Dr. Kohler's motion for expert 
fees, and I'm not sure, and a motion for summary judgment. 
Correct? 
MR. NEWHALL: Yes, Your Honor. But we will a, 
we have, we have no problem dropping our motion for 
arbitration. That seems to be, that was an issue that 
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seems to have gone by the board. At this point there's 
not a reason to continue with that motion as far as I'm 
concerned. 
THE JUDGE: All right. We won't worry about 
that. 
All right. Do either of you or any of you have 
any suggestions in what order you want to proceed? I won't 
dictate that, I'll let you— 
MR. NEWHALL: I do, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. NEWHALL: I suggest, well, first of all 
Mr. DuBois and I had a bit of a controversy beforehand. 
There are a couple of motions here that, that are 
supplementary, so to speak, to a motion to summary judgment. 
The motion to strike Dr. Hance's affidavit is important to 
the motion for summary judgment. And I agreed with 
Mr. DuBois beforehand that even though that had not been 
noticed up, so to speak, it could be argued at this hearing 
in order to get the motion for a summary judgment out of the 
way, if that's acceptable to Your Honor. 
However my, my quid pro quo was that we would also 
argue my motion for an alternative expert or to strike 
Dr. Friedenberg's deposition testimony. A motion which, 
which similar to the a, to the motion for striking the 
affidavit, had not exactly been noticed up to the Court but 
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which I think is important to the issue of whether we can set 
a trial date and when. 
So I would like to argue the motion for summary 
judgment and the affidavit striking motion first because 
obviously that's germain to all the other issues. And then 
should we be successful in opposing the summary judgment 
motion I'd like to continue on to the motion to strike 
Dr. Friedenberg and add a plaintiff or alternatively add a 
plaintiff's expert. 
That would be my suggestion, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. 
MR. DUBOIS: Your Honor, we're not prepared today 
to talk about Dr. Friedenberg' s, that motion to strike his 
testimony and I, I need time to prepare to argue that 
properly. And so I can't agree to the quid pro quo that's 
been proposed. 
THE JUDGE: Can we proceed on the motion for 
summary judgment and the affidavit motion that you've 
filed? 
MR. DUBOIS: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: Hear that today. 
MR. DUBOIS: Sure. 
THE JUDGE: Then we'll see depending on how that 
turns out what to do next. Wouldn't that be efficient and 
something we can take care of? 
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MR. NEWHALL: That's... I was trying to get more 
of it done at once than we could by our agreement. But 
that's okay with me, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. All right. Let's, let's 
hear that then, the motion for summary judgment. And then 
you can argue while you argue that the motion to strike the 
affidavit of Dr. Hance. 
MR. DUBOIS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
ARGUMENT BY MR. DUBOIS 
MR. DUBOIS: Your Honor, we filed a motion for 
summary judgment on behalf of Dr. Watts because the plaintiff 
has failed to prove a prima facie case of negligence against 
him. Specifically the plaintiff has not provided expert 
testimony that connects the treatment provided by Dr. Watts 
to the injuries that the plaintiff is claiming. The 
plaintiff has not produced expert testimony that connects her 
past, and more particularly her current physical complaints, 
to any negligence on behalf of Dr. Watts. And on that basis 
we reguest that the Court enter a summary judgment in favor 
of Dr. Watts. 
Prior to discussing the substance of our motion a, 
and memorandum in support I want to note a procedural 
deficiency in the plaintiff's opposition to our motion for 
summary judgment. 
As the Court knows, Rule 4-501(b) reguires the 
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plaintiff to specifically dispute facts that are contained 
in our motion and memorandum for summary judgment. The 
language in Rule 4-501(b) is mandatory, it's not 
permissive. It indicates that the plaintiff shall, or the 
person opposing a motion for summary judgment shall 
specifically set forth paragraphs to which there is a dispute 
in terms of material fact. And the plaintiffs, or the 
plaintiff failed to do that in her opposition. There is no 
specific denial of any specific factual paragraph that's 
contained in the memorandum. 
The rule indicates that to the extent that the 
plaintiff, or the person opposing the motion for summary 
judgment, does not specifically contradict or dispute the 
material statement of fact that that fact shall be deemed 
admitted. Again, the language is mandatory, not 
permissive. 
On that basis insofar as the facts that are set 
forth in our motion for summary judgment, counsel in favor of 
entry of summary judgment, I would submit that you enter 
summary judgment. All of the facts have to be deemed 
admitted and on that basis summary judgment is indicated. 
I know that's a harsh remedy but that's what the rule 
requires. 
In addition a, to the extent that, that the 
opposition does not specifically refute facts that are set 
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forth in the motion for summary judgment, the issues aren't 
framed for the Court properly. You don't know which facts 
are in dispute and which ones aren't. And they may claim 
that there's an inference that there's a dispute as to 
material fact because the opposition opposes some of the 
arguments that are in the motion for summary judgment. But 
that's not sufficient under the rule. 
With that in mind I'm going to move on to the 
substance of our argument for summary judgment. 
The legal standard is a, that the plaintiff needs 
to prove a prima facie, prima facie case of negligence. That 
is the plaintiff must establish a duty, a breach of the duty, 
they must show that that breach is the proximate cause of 
injury, and they must prove that the plaintiff has suffered 
damage. And there is ample legal authority supporting the 
notion that the plaintiff must prove with competent expert 
testimony that the alleged negligence is the cause of the 
injuries that are being claimed. And the plaintiff 
acknowledges that in the opposition that they must prove with 
expert testimony that there is some causal connection between 
the alleged negligence and the injury. 
Based upon the depositions that have been taken and 
all of the expert information that's been provided by the 
plaintiff there is no causal connection between the alleged 
negligence on behalf of Dr. Watts and the injuries that the 
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plaintiff claims that she suffered at the time, and more 
particularly the a, injuries that she's claiming that she has 
now. It's prudent to discuss each of the injuries that's 
claimed by the plaintiff and see what kind of expert 
testimony they've got supporting those claims. 
The first injury that's identified by the plaintiff 
is a, that she had a gall bladder surgery that was not 
indicated, that she had a, some stomach complaints and some 
indications that something was required. She subsequently 
underwent a gall bladder surgery and she's saying that wasn't 
necessary. 
THE JUDGE: Let me, let me stop you here. 
MR. DUBOIS: Sure. 
THE JUDGE: I want you to, I want you to stick to 
your argument but I'd like you to just summarize for us the 
a, the case— 
MR. DUBOIS: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: — from your point of view. 
MR. DUBOIS: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: What's this case about and a, why you 
are arguing that there is no proximate cause here as a matter 
of law. 
MR. DUBOIS: Okay. I'd be happy to, Your Honor. 
We, we set forth the, the history of the case and the history 
of the treatment that was provided in our motion. 
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THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. DUBOIS: But briefly, this case involves a, an 
allegation that there was a surgery and some complications 
with surgery. My client is Dr. Watts. Dr. Watts is the 
plaintiff's nephew— 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. DUBOIS: — who provides radiology services 
at Utah Valley. Ms., I'm going to call her MacLeod because 
that's how we've been referring to her throughout the course 
of the litigation, and in fact, even in supplemental 
pleadings that have been filed by the, by the plaintiff after 
her name change they still call her Mrs. MacLeod. So for 
purposes of the hearing I'll call her Mrs. MacLeod. 
Mrs. MacLeod had some, in October of 1998 had 
complaints of stomach pain, problems. She a, sought out her 
nephew and said I need you, you know, I've got these 
complaints, I think that I need, something needs to be 
done. Dr. Watts agreed to a, take a look at her and to make 
a referral if appropriate. 
Ms. MacLeod came down from, she lived in Logan at 
the time, came down to Provo, saw her nephew, he conducted a 
couple of radiographic studies. He referred her to a 
gastroenterologist who also did some studies, and then 
subseguently she was referred to Dr. Kohler. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
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MR. DUBOIS: Dr. Kohler then made an independent 
determination that a gall bladder surgery was indicated. 
Ms. MacLeod underwent gall bladder surgery on November 3rd, 
1998, was discharged on November 4th. Went to her niece's 
home and recuperated for a couple of days. During that, 
that, the course of those couple of days she continued to 
have some stomach pain. Dr. Kohler a, went out, had to go 
out of town after the surgery. So Mrs. MacLeod when she 
didn't feel much better after the surgery called Dr. Watts 
and said I don't feel well, and so Dr. Watts agreed to see 
her. Dr. Watts knowing that Dr. Kohler was out of town 
admitted Ms. MacLeod to the hospital, followed her for a 
couple of days. 
And then a, Dr. Kohler came back. At that point 
it was determined that there had been a, a perforation to her 
bowel during the surgery that needed to be repaired. That 
was repaired on November 9th, 1998. After the second 
surgery Ms. MacLeod was in the hospital, continued to receive 
care, had some complications, she was discharged on a, from 
the hospital on November 24th, 1998. 
Our, our contention is that the plaintiffs have two 
expert witnesses, both of them were asked their, their 
opinions on causation. Neither of those experts would 
testify that or could testify that Ms. MacLeod had suffered 
or is suffering from any injury or complication after 
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November 24th, 1998. 
In other words, in her complaint Ms. MacLeod 
discusses a litany of current problems that she's got. In 
her deposition she talked about some more injuries and 
complications that she has currently. 
Neither of the plaintiff's experts know what her 
current condition is, they don't know what her complaints 
are, they don't, and they are not willing and will not 
testify that there's any connection between what Dr. Watts or 
Dr. Kohler did in the hospital and the complaints that she's 
currently got. So at the very least there's no, there's no 
causation testimony that connects any treatment provided at 
the hospital to any condition after November 24th of 1998. 
That's been conceded by the plaintiff. 
Now, on the front end, and I'm kind of getting 
ahead of myself in terms of the argument, but our, our 
argument is that the decision to a, to take Mrs. MacLeod to 
surgery was made by Dr. Kohler. And so the plaintiffs have 
no... I mean, in fact both plaintiff's experts conceded 
that that decision was made by Dr. Kohler. And so the 
plaintiffs have in a sense proven that Dr. Watts cannot be 
held responsible for that decision and any injury associated 
with this surgery that may or may not have been indicated. 
I don't know if that provides a basis for— 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
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MR. DUBOIS: — we've got more specific arguments 
on some of the other issues of causation but I'd be happy 
to— 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. 
MR. DUBOIS: — provide more detail. 
THE JUDGE: No. 
MR. DUBOIS: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. 
MR. DUBOIS: The first injury that I had, that I 
had mentioned, and I just touched on it briefly, was that the 
gall bladder surgery was not indicated. That's the 
plaintiff's assertion. And that Dr. Watts should somehow be 
held responsible for the decision to go forward with 
surgery. 
As I mentioned, in 1998 Dr. Watts was contacted by 
a, Mrs. MacLeod regarding her complaints of stomach pain. 
Dr. Watts arranged for testing to be done by Dr. Hemmert 
(phonetic) and arranged for the surgical consultation by 
Dr. Kohler. Dr. Kohler evaluated Mrs. MacLeod and made the 
decision to go forward with surgery. Dr. Hance testified, 
who is the plaintiff's radiology expert, testified that the 
decision to go forward with surgery was made a, by 
Dr. Kohler. 
And in his deposition. 
"Question: Is it your belief, 
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1 Dr. Hance, that Dr. Watts played any 
2 active role in the actual decision of 
3 whether or not to undergo surgery that 
4 Dr. Kohler performed? 
5 Answer: No. 
6 Question: And you would concede, would 
7 || you not, that he had absolutely, that he 
had absolutely nothing to do with that 
9 I decision? 
Answer: He had nothing to do with the 
decision. He just facilitated the 
referral to Dr. Kohler and Dr. Kohler 
10 
11 
12 
13 I made the decision to operate." 
14 
16 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
And then further in Dr. Hance's deposition 
15 || "Question: Whether or not a person is 
a candidate for surgery, is that 
17 something that falls within the training 
18 and experience of a general surgeon as 
19 || opposed to a radiologist? 
Answer: The general surgeon is the one 
that makes the ultimate decision whether 
he's going to operate or not. A 
radiologist cannot operate. So it has 
to be the general surgeon that makes the 
25 | final decision 
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Question: All right. And radiologists 
always defer to the general surgeon, do 
they not, after the studies are done? 
Answer: That's right. You give them 
the information and they take it from 
there. 
Question: So if opposed whether or not 
surgery is indicated or not indicated it 
would be beyond the training of a 
radiologist to interpose himself in that 
decision making process? 
Answer: Correct." 
In addition to the testimony of Dr. Hance, a, the 
deposition of Dr. Anaise who is the plaintiff's plaintiff's 
surgery expert was taken. And Dr. Anaise also testified that 
the decision to take Ms. MacLeod to surgery was made by 
Dr. Kohler and not by Dr. Watts. 
Accordingly, Dr. Watts can't be held to be 
responsible for the decision to go forward with surgery or 
any injuries associated with that decision. And even if the 
plaintiff is able to establish that surgery was not 
indicated, a, and that Ms. MacLeod suffered some injury as a 
result of that decision, Dr. Watts didn't cause the injury 
according to the plaintiff's own experts. And whether or 
not the surgery was in fact indicated or not is something 
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that will be determined at trial. We believe that it was. 
But in any event, Dr. Watts can't be held responsible or 
liable for that decision or any injuries associated with 
that. 
The a, second injury that Ms. MacLeod claims was 
that her bowel was nicked during the first surgery which 
reguired a second surgery. Now, Dr. Anaise and Dr. Hance 
both testified that the second surgery was necessary a, due 
to the complication that occurred in the first surgery. It 
was going to have to happen one way or the other. And 
insofar as Dr. Watts didn't make the decision to go forward 
with the first surgery, Dr. Watts can't be held responsible 
for the need for the second surgery. 
Accordingly, again, if the plaintiffs can establish 
some injury in connection with the decision to go, to take 
her to surgery in the first place and the required second 
surgery, Dr. Watts by the plaintiff's own experts' 
depositions can't be held responsible for any of those 
related injuries. 
The third injury that the plaintiff claims in 
connection with Dr. Watts' treatment is, is in connection 
with Dr. Watts' treatment between November 6th and 
November 9th when Dr. Watts admitted Ms. MacLeod to the 
hospital. 
As I mentioned, Ms. MacLeod's surgery was on 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
November 3rd, 1998. After her first surgery she testified 
she had some stomach pains and other symptoms. Ms. MacLeod 
contacted Dr. Watts because Dr. Kohler was out of town. 
Dr. Watts admitted Ms. MacLeod to the hospital on 
November 6th and provided supportive care until Dr. Kohler 
returned on November 9 when the second surgery was done. 
The plaintiff claims that there was some delay in 
diagnosing the perforation that occurred during the first 
surgery and that there was a delay in. taking Ms. MacLeod back 
for surgery. However, the plaintiffs must prove that 
Dr. Watts' treatment and the supposed delay in taking her 
back to surgery caused some actual specific injury. 
Dr. Hance in his deposition and in his subsequent 
affidavit testified that a, she had an abscess, that an 
abscess formed during that interval. There is no 
connection and no testimony that connects that abscess 
to any subsequent injury that Ms. MacLeod suffered after her 
second surgery on the 9th. There is no expert testimony 
that makes any connection to that abscess to any subsequent 
complication that she suffered after the surgery on 
November 9th. 
In addition there's no, there's absolutely no 
testimony that connects that abscess or anything that 
happened between November 6 and November 9 to any subsequent 
injury that Ms. MacLeod suffered after her discharge from the 
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hospital on November 24th, 1998. 
Therefore, even though, even if she did have an 
abscess a, and that would, resulted during November 6th 
through November 9 there is no testimony that connects that 
abscess, which is a claimed injury, to any other injury at 
all or any other medical complication. 
In addition, there is no expert testimony that 
Ms. MacLeod would have been taken back to surgery any sooner 
than November 9th had a surgeon been contacted as they 
suggest. There's no expert testimony that says that second 
surgery would have happened any sooner, and so there really 
is no connection to an actual injury if she wouldn't have 
been taken back to surgery any sooner. And so on that basis 
there is just no expert testimony that indicates, supports a 
claim that Dr. Watts' alleged negligence caused any harm even 
between November 6th and November 9th. 
Lastly, Ms. MacLeod is currently claiming quite a 
few problems. In her complaint Ms. MacLeod states that she 
has medical and household expenses, chronic diarrhea and 
other gastrointestinal disorders, disability, loss of 
enjoyment of life, emotional distress. And in her deposition 
Ms. MacLeod testified that she has fatigue, weight gain, 
scarring, loss of physical strength. And she also tries to 
make a connection between her treatment in November of 1998 
and her divorce and some debts that were incurred that 
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weren't related to medical treatment. 
Importantly, there is absolutely no expert 
testimony that establishes any connection between 
Ms. MacLeod's current complaints, her current condition, her 
current complaints, her current claims of injury, and any 
care provided by Dr. Watts. 
Dr. Hance in his a, deposition testified, that he's 
not aware of Ms. MacLeod's current condition and has no 
information in fact regarding her, her condition after 
November 24th, 1998. In Dr. Hance's deposition on page 45 
there's a question: 
"Just so I'm clear, Doctor, do you 
intent to render any opinions with 
respect to Mrs. MacLeod's current 
condition and whether or not any of the 
current problems she claims to suffer 
from were caused by this delay in doing 
the second surgery? 
Answer: I am not aware of her current 
problems. My involvement ends with her 
24 of November 1998." 
He doesn't know her current conditions, he will not 
offer any testimony that the care provided in November of 
1998 is connected to any current complaint, problem, injury, 
so forth. 
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On page 64 of Dr. Hance's deposition. 
"Question: Do you know if after the 
surgery that her syrnptomology improved? 
Answer: Well, I've only reviewed until 
the time of her discharge. And I know 
she was very very sick there when she was 
in the hospital so I won't call that, I 
won't call that an improvement. After 
discharge from the hospital I honestly 
don't know and I can't answer your 
question.". 
Dr. Hance is not going to testify that any current 
injury, complaint is connected in any way to the treatment 
that was provided in November of 1998. 
Dr. Anaise a, who is the plaintiff's surgery 
expert, also was asked his opinions regarding a causation. 
And Dr. Anaise in response to the questioning on page 76 of 
his deposition: 
"Question: Dr. Anece, you have been 
asked to render opinions with respect to 
the causation of any injuries".... Or 
..."have you been asked to render 
opinions with respect to the causation of 
any injuries or any complaints that 
Ms. MacLeod has as they relate to any of 
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the events that took place from 
November 3rd, 1998 through the conclusion 
of the discharge from her second 
hospitalization? 
Answer: I think I'm rendering an 
opinion about one particular damage and 
that was the high probability of having 
the bowel obstruction that I thought was 
directly caused by the surgery that 
preceded. I was not asked to comment but 
mentioned in passing things like 
hypoglycemia, fluid management or 
pneumothorax and so on because I thought 
they were going to be covered by the 
other experts." 
And then. 
"Question: Doctor, apart from her 
supposed increased likelihood of 
suffering from a bowel obstruction of 
some sort, do you intend to testify at 
trial that to a reasonable degree of 
medical probability any of Ms. MacLeod's 
complaints or problems are proximately 
caused by any of the events from 
November 3rd to November 24th? 
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Answer: I was not prepared for this 
question. And I think it's covered by 
other experts." 
And then there's a, some discussion on the 
record. The answer continues: 
"I am not prepared to testify to that at 
this junction. I was led to believe 
other experts would cover that. I think 
it would be redundant at most. 
Question. The answer as you sit here 
today? 
Answer: The answer is no." 
The only thing that Dr. Anaise is going to speak t 
is the possibility of a future bowel obstruction. No other 
causation testimony, no other testimony that connects any 
treatment in November of 1998 to any problems that 
Ms. MacLeod claims that she is currently suffering from. 
With respect to Dr. Anaise's testimony regarding a 
high probability of future bowel obstruction, a, in Section 
of our memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment 
we argued that Ms. MacLeod must show an actual injury, not 
just the risk of injury to prove causation and to prove 
damages. And that's the Hansen versus Mt. Fuel case, 
Mt. Fuel Supply case. 
The plaintiff did not address that argument in 
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the opposition. It has been conceded that they must show 
an actual injury, not just a future possibility of injury. 
Thus, even if Dr. Hance's affidavit is not 
stricken, and we'll get to that next, even if that affidavit 
is not stricken there is absolutely no testimony linking or 
connecting the treatment provided by Dr. Watts to any injury 
suffered or allegedly suffered after November 24th of 1998. 
And in fact, if you look at the plaintiff's opposition the 
plaintiff concedes that no connection has been made but 
rather focuses on some injuries that may have occurred while 
she was in the hospital. They don't talk about anything 
that happened after November 24th of 1998, even in the 
opposition. 
THE JUDGE: Tell me why November 2 4th is the day 
you keep talking about. I thought the— 
MR. DUBOIS: The reason for November 24th i s — 
THE JUDGE: — (short inaudible, two speakers) 
November 9th. That was the second surgery. 
MR. DUBOIS: Yes, Your Honor. There, there is 
the plaintiff was a, after the second surgery— 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. DUBOIS: — remained in the hospital— 
THE JUDGE: Until— 
MR. DUBOIS: — until November 24th. That's 
when she was discharged from the hospital. 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. 
MR. DUBOIS: And I'm sorry if that wasn't made 
clear. And the reason why I, I note November 24th is 
because Dr. Hance in his deposition testified that he had 
reviewed all the records up through discharge, nothing after 
discharge. 
Briefly with respect to the affidavit of, of 
Dr. Hance. After we filed the motion for summary judgment 
pointing out the deficiencies in the plaintiff's experts' 
deposition testimony, the plaintiff a, with the opposition 
submitted the affidavit of Dr. Hance. Dr. Hance offers a 
few supplemental opinions, things that he was, he was asked 
about during his deposition but he didn't provide in direct 
response, in response to questions at deposition. 
We have made a motion to strike Dr. Hance's 
affidavit a, or portions of his affidavit for several 
reasons. One is that he lacks foundation to testify to, to 
some of the things he testifies to. And second, the 
affidavit impermissibly attempts to add opinions to his 
deposition testimony. He was asked questions at his 
deposition, he had the opportunity to provide all of his 
opinions, and a, it's unfair for the plaintiffs to be able to 
offer additional opinions in an affidavit where we don't have 
the ability to cross examine Dr. Hance. 
And the third reason to strike Dr. Hance's 
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deposition, or his affidavit, is that portions of the 
affidavit a, where he attempts to establish some causation 
and connection to some injury are conclusionary and vague. 
For instance, Dr. Hance indicates that Ms. MacLeod suffered 
additional hospitalization but, but doesn't say what 
additional hospitalization, how many days, why it was, why 
there's a connection to the treatment that was provided by 
Dr. Watts. 
Under Rule 56(e) affidavits must be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters that are 
stated in the affidavit. Therefore, to the extent that 
Dr. Hance's affidavit doesn't comport with Rule 56(e) it 
should be stricken. 
Dr. Hance is board certified in radiologist and 
nuclear medicine. Dr. Hance conceded in his deposition that 
he was not qualified to a, offer opinions regarding general 
surgery issues. And a, you'll remember the, the deposition 
testimony that I read just a moment ago he, he defers to a 
general surgeon on the question of whether or not surgery is 
indicated. 
Dr. Hance also testified that the determination, 
of whether a person is a candidate for a surgery is made by 
the general surgeon. That's the testimony that I read 
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Paragraph 7(g) and 7(h) of Dr. Hance, his affidavit 
offers an opinion that Dr. Watts' referral of Ms. MacLeod to 
Dr. Kohler led to surgery. Dr. Hance doesn't have the 
foundation to a, testify that Dr. Watts' referral led to 
surgery. Dr. Watts' referral didn't lead to surgery, it led 
to a referral. Whether or not Ms. MacLeod was ultimately 
taken to surgery is a decision that he is not qualified to 
make. He said he would not offer opinions about that. 
And, therefore his, his affidavit to the extent that it 
implies that Dr. Watts, his referral led to surgery should be 
stricken because it's simply, he lacks foundation to offer 
that opinion. 
In addition, paragraph 7-L through 7-N should, be 
stricken because he lacks the foundation to offer opinions 
regarding a, when a surgeon would have, would have taken her 
to the second surgery. Dr. Hance says if a surgeon had been 
contacted then she would have been taken to surgery more 
quickly. He lacks foundation to offer that opinion. He 
can't say when a surgeon would have taken her to surgery. 
A — 
THE JUDGE: Are there cases in your experience 
where there's been liability on, based on a negligent 
referral? Have you seen those? 
MR. DUBOIS: I'm not aware of any. And the 
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plaintiffs don't cite any. And the plaintiff's argument is 
that the simple referral led to surgery. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. DUBOIS: And that would, that would hold water 
if every referral resulted in a surgery. But they don't. 
That's why you refer someone to a specialist so they can make 
an independent determination based upon their, their 
experience and knowledge of whether or not to take someone to 
surgery or not. I mean, if the plaintiff's argument is 
accepted that means that the person that drove Ms. MacLeod to 
the hospital could be held liable too. If they hadn't driven 
her to the hospital she wouldn't have had surgery. It's the 
same kind of logic. 
I would, I would suggest that the referral to a 
specialist breaks the chain of causation. 
THE JUDGE: Isn't it foreseeable though that an 
intervenor such as Dr. Kohler could negligently perform a 
surgery causing injury to the plaintiff? 
MR. DUBOIS: I don't think so. And that argument 
hasn't been made and it hasn't been briefed that it's a 
foreseeable... That's, that's a separate issue. I, I think 
that that, that's why you refer someone to a specialist is so 
they can make an independent determination of whether or not 
surgery is indicated. 
Once Dr. Watts makes that referral he's out of the 
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picture, he's not making decisions, he's, and whether or not 
a person is ultimately taken to surgery or not is up to the 
specialist. And that's what Dr. Hance testified to and 
that's what Dr. Anaise testified to. 
THE JUDGE: I know it's not briefed and I 
recognize that. But it was a question that I had that seems 
to me that needs to be answered and that's why I asked about 
the cases where there was an alleged negligent referral 
caused subsequent injury as a result of the intervening 
negligence of the surgeon or of a doctor. 
MR. DUBOIS: That's not an allegation that's made 
in this— 
THE JUDGE: That's a theory though of the case. 
MR. DUBOIS: It's not, that's, that's an 
allegation that hasn't been especially made and it hasn't 
been briefed. And I'm not, as I sit here today, Your Honor, 
I'm not of aware of any cases. We could probably undertake 
some supplemental research and, and brief that issue for 
you. 
THE JUDGE: Well, don't we have to address it 
sooner or later? That's the theory of their case that a, 
Dr. Watts referred the plaintiff to a surgeon without 
consulting the primary care physician, Dr. Salisbury, 
which resulted in this surgery, which resulted in this 
damage. 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. DUBOIS: And our argument is that once the 
referral is made that the chain of causation is broken, that 
the decision in this, that's the testimony of both their 
experts is that once he makes the referral he's out of the 
picture. Dr. Watts plays no role at all in the decision to 
take-her to surgery or not. 
THE JUDGE: And the fact, and that there are no 
disputed facts, it's undisputed that that's what happened and 
as a matter of law this Court can decide an intervening act 
question on proximate cause? 
MR. DUBOIS: Correct. And that's the, that's the 
testimony of their own experts. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. DUBOIS: In addition to lacking foundation 
we've, we've briefed the question whether Dr. Hance's 
supplemental testimony is a, inconsistent with or attempts to 
add to his deposition testimony. It's clear that his 
supplemental opinions are just that, they're supplemental. 
He was asked questions and he was allowed to offer opinions 
during his deposition. He didn't offer those opinions 
during his deposition a, with respect to causation and that's 
that there was additional hospitalization and that there are 
additional medical bills, that he didn't discuss that in his 
deposition and we weren't provided with an opportunity to 
cross examine him regarding those opinions. And based on 
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that we believe they should be stricken. 
And we've also briefed the question of whether or 
not his a, deposition testimony is vague and conclusionary. 
We suggest that it is, and there is case law that suggests 
that an affidavit should be stricken to the extent that it is 
vague and conclusionary. That is that there were additional 
complications or additional a, medical bills. Dr. Hance 
didn't testify what specific hospitalization was additional, 
he didn't testify what specific hospital bills were 
incurred. 
And that's the danger of allowing him to produce 
supplemental opinions through an affidavit where we're not 
allowed to or have the opportunity to, to question him about 
those opinions and s o — 
THE JUDGE: But he did give an opinion about the 
referral. 
MR. DUBOIS: He did. 
THE JUDGE: He did say that he didn't think that 
was appropriate. 
MR. DUBOIS: Well, h e — 
THE JUDGE: I may not have used the right word 
but— 
MR. DUBOIS: I think that— 
THE JUDGE: — he did give an expert opinion that 
that referral should never have been made. 
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MR. DUBOIS: I think he made, he did give an 
opinion to that extent. But I think that his affidavit 
testimony is inconsistent with and contradicted by the 
deposition testimony that he gave which is a, he's, he's 
implying in his affidavit that Dr. Watts is responsible for 
the decision to go forward with the surgery, which is 
contradicted and is inconsistent with his deposition 
testimony where he said the, that Dr. Watts had, doesn't have 
the foundation to, to, or Dr. Watts isn't involved in the 
decision of whether or not to take her to surgery. That's a 
surgeon's call. Once the referral is made he is completely 
out of the picture. That's what Dr. Hance said in his 
deposition. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. DUBOIS: And so that contradicts his 
affidavit. 
THE JUDGE: I understand. 
MR. DUBOIS: With that, I don't believe that we've-
got anymore. 
THE JUDGE: I'll ask Counsel. I'm not sure that's 
their theory but a, we'll ask them. 
MR. DUBOIS: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: We'll see what he says. 
It's not your theory is it, Counsel, that, that 
Dr. Watts had anything to do with the decision to perform the 
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surgery in this case? That was Dr. Kohler. And a, you're 
not claiming that there was any negligence on the part of 
Dr. Watts in that regard, are you? 
ARGUMENT BY MR. NEWHALL 
MR. NEWHALL: You're correct, Your Honor. We're 
claiming that Dr. Watts' referral was negligent— 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. NEWHALL: — and that that negligent referral 
was the reason this lady underwent surgery which caused her 
injury. And that but for that negligent referral she would 
not have had the injury. This is a but for case. It's 
much clearer than a foreseeable case. 
If you're looking for a foreseeability case on 
negligent referral I have to admit that I don't have one. 
But it seems to me similar to the case that, that I learned 
about in torts so many years ago where the radio disk jockey 
driving around town broadcasting that his license plate was 
visible and people could win a prize if they called in a 
certain number. It was foreseeable that if people called in 
that number chasing the disk jockey around they might get 
into an accident. And he was held liable on the basis of 
that foreseeability similar to the, to the claim take we're 
making. 
THE JUDGE: But you have to, you have to have 
that. You can't just rely on the but for. 
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MR. NEWHALL: Well, Your Honor— 
2 I THE JUDGE: That doesn't establish causation 
3 I MR. NEWHALL: Well, Your Honor, I believe that not 
4 II only is it but for, but it is foreseeable. After all — 
5 THE JUDGE: How is it foreseeable? 
6 MR. NEWHALL: — this, this lady' would not have 
7 seen a surgeon, she would never have been to see this 
8 surgeon. It's foreseeable that her nephew the surgeon is 
9 going, or I'm sorry her nephew the radiologist is going to 
10 send her to a surgeon and that she will have surgery as a 
11 result of having her seen by the surgeon. 
12 THE JUDGE: Do you have any case in any 
13 jurisdiction where liability had been found for a negligent 
14 referral? 
15 MR. NEWHALL: A negligent medical referral. No, 
16 I do not, the additional— 
17 THE JUDGE: Well that's, that's your case, isn't 
18 it? I mean, I don't mean to be simplistic but— 
19 MR. NEWHALL: As you put it, Your Honor, it is my 
20 case. And, and if I have to search for a case of that 
21 nature then I'm sure I can find one. But I didn't brief 
22 || that, as Mr. DuBois points out, because we're not as 
23 || perceptive as you and haven't figured out that that's the 
24 case I guess. 
25 | But that's not the only issue as to negligence with. 
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respect to Dr. Watts. Mr., Mr. DuBois points out again and 
again that his claim that, that Mrs. MacLeod suffered, 
Ms. Johnson suffered no injuries after November 24th, there's 
several things that he fails to note, however. 
First of all, Dr. Hance opined that for Dr. Watts 
to admit Mrs., Ms. Johnson to the hospital and 'not consult 
the surgeon was negligent. 
Dr. Barton who is the a, expert surgeon for 
Dr. Kohler and whose deposition is included, as I recall it 
was taken after— 
THE JUDGE: Well, just a minute. I'm lost on the 
facts. 
MR. NEWHALL: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: He, Dr. Watts refers her to 
Dr. Kohler. 
MR. NEWHALL: Dr. Watts referred her. 
THE JUDGE: Dr. Kohler admitted her into the 
hospital. 
MR. NEWHALL: I'm sorry. On the second 
admission. Dr. Kohler admitted her the first time, 
operated, sent her home, went out of town. This lady 
complained of not a little bit of abdominal pain but a lot of 
abdominal pain. References to her stomach being on fire 
were made. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
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MR. NEWHALL: She then called her nephew a couple 
of times, who after a couple of calls put her into the 
hospital. And rather than calling the surgeon who was on 
call for Dr. Kohler and was in the hospital almost 24 hours a 
day, according to him, rather than call the on call surgeon, 
Dr. Watts chose to take care of this lady himself— 
THE JUDGE: I see. 
MR. NEWHALL: — for a period o f — 
THE JUDGE: From the 6th to the 9th until the 
doctor came. 
MR. NEWHALL: Correct. For a period of three 
days 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. NEWHALL: During that time he administered 
virtually no treatment except at the very end when he started 
antibiotics apparently after calling Dr. Kohler Sunday night, 
the night of the 8th. 
Dr. Barton, who is the surgeon expert for 
Dr. Kohler, opined that it was more likely than not that 
that delay of two days caused an increase in the infection, 
an increase in the abscess, an increase in the cellulitis. 
And certainly we can assume, I think without even expert 
testimony, that those two days involved medical costs that 
she would not have borne had she been treated earlier. 
In any case, that's the second of our contentions 
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as to his negligence. 
Now, as a result of that second surgery she had a 
very large scar. We didn't, feel it was necessary to point 
out that that scar, which took time to heal after she was 
discharged from the hospital on the 24th, and which required 
further medical treatment after she was treated, I'm sorry, 
discharged on the 24th, it didn't seem necessary to point 
out that that constituted damages as a result of the 
surgery. 
But it's necessary to point that out we can refer 
to Dr. Salisbury, her treating physician, who noted the scar 
and noted the treatment, and noted that he ordered home 
health care treatment for her to take care of that scar after 
the 24th, her discharge date. 
I don't think that... I admit that there's no 
negligent referral case that I can point, to. I don't think 
though that it's outside the realm of anyone's a, common 
knowledge that if someone is referred to a surgeon, surgery 
when it ensues can involve complications, and again, those 
complications can be negligent or nonnegligent. 
In this case we're contending that the 
complications were negligent. But even if they weren't, 
Dr. Kohler's decision to perform surgery is certainly a 
foreseeable one to a doctor, let alone a layman, when someone 
is referred to surgery, to a surgeon. If Dr. Watts didn't 
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foresee that referring this lady to a surgeon might involve 
surgery, then why in the world would he refer her to a 
surgeon? Why leave her with gastroenterologist who doesn't 
perform surgery. 
That seems to me to be an argument that doesn't 
require any kind of case support. A doctor's role as a 
professional is to refer patients appropriately. And a 
doctor's role as a professional is to know what those 
referrals might involve before making those referrals. 
After all, if a doctor refers a patient for lab 
tests, a doctor ought to know that the person might get stuck 
for the lab test and might end up with an infection from the, 
from the point of being stuck. Now, if the doctor 
negligently referred someone for the lab test then, then it 
would be foreseeable that that negligent act could result in 
injury. 
THE JUDGE: So a doctor who is conservative in his 
practice and decides to make a referral to a specialist to 
examine a potential problem could open him or herself up to 
liability if that specialist then negligently performs a test 
or a procedure? 
MR. NEWHALL: Only if that doctor, one, knew that 
the surgeon was likely to perform a negligent procedure, and 
two, the doctor himself were negligent in making the 
referral. In this case we have the second of those two, the 
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doctor himself was likely, or I'm sorry, the doctor himself 
knew, should have known that this referral was unnecessary. 
So his negligence is continued through by the injury that 
occurred. 
If we had not asserted that Dr. Kohler was 
negligent and if we had not put'Dr. Kohler into this lawsuit 
the situation would be exactly the same. Dr. Watts makes 
the referral negligently. Whether Dr. Kohler is in the 
middle or not is irrelevant. If Dr. Watts had not made the 
referral negligently, if he had talked to say Dr. Salisbury 
and said gee, Dr. Salisbury, this lady seems to have 
problems, she seems to have problems that require surgical 
consultation, we have surgeons down here, what do you think. 
Dr. Salisbury, who knows this lady very well, goes over the 
things with Dr. Watts and says yes, I agree, that's probably 
a good idea, let's have a, let's have a referral to a 
surgeon, maybe, maybe she needs an operation. I don't see 
any negligence, I don't see how we can say that the 
foreseeability of the surgery as a result of the negligence 
was the fault of Dr. Watts. 
But he didn't make a reasoned decision, he made a 
negligent decision to refer her. 
THE JUDGE: Let's talk about the time period from 
the 6th through the 9th, what your experts say that Dr. Watts 
did wrong. 
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MR. NEWHALL: Our experts say that Dr. Watts 
should have consulted a surgeon rather than try to take care 
of his aunt himself. 
THE JUDGE: Everybody agrees that he can't 
decide whether to have surgery or not. Your expert agreed 
as well. 
MR. NEWHALL: That's right. But they also agree 
that he doesn't know what to do to take care of somebody who 
has a surgical or post surgical problem. 
Dr. Barton, who is the surgical expert for Kohler, 
says that it's more likely than not that this lady's problems 
in that intervening period grew worse without the use of 
antibiotics, without the intervention of a surgeon. And 
that if Dr. Kohler had seen her and if Dr. Kohler had found 
the findings which she claims werp ,pras£nt.^ ...and which we 
don't know whether they were present according to Watts or 
not because he didn't write a note about his physical exam, 
Barton says that if those finding had been present she 
probably would have been operated on the 5th rather than on 
the 9th, sorry, 6th. 
We think that all. of that information is sufficient 
to justify that this case go to trial on the issue of 
Dr. Watts' negligence and the causation. The foreseeability 
issue is, is an issue of law, I'll concede that. But I 
don't think it's an issue that requires an expert opinion 
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to tell you that it's foreseeable that, that a doctor's 
negligence can result in another doctor's negligence causing 
a problem. 
The analogy to the driver of the car is, is 
inapposite because the driver of the car is not negligent 
driving someone to the hospital, it is not foreseeable that 
the driver of the car taking someone to the hospital was 
going to be, to the hospital, to a surgeon even, that the 
person is going to be operated on. 
But here where Dr. Watts had clearly worked this 
lady up, sent her to gastroenterologist, knew her history, of 
course he knew that sending her to a surgeon meant more 
likely than not surgery. Why else would he send her to a 
surgeon? That's not the, he's not getting an answer as to 
what is this lady's problem from a surgeon. He's getting an 
answer as to whether or not she needs surgery. And he 
already knew that because he had already worked her up. 
So that's my argument on that issue, Your Honor. 
Did you have other questions? 
THE JUDGE: No. Thank you. 
MR. NEWHALL: Did I... Do you need me to quote 
from Dr. Barton's deposition, which wasn't included in 
your— 
THE JUDGE: Well, I'm troubled by this negligent 
referral. I'll be open with you about that. I'm not as 
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troubled, I want to hear the opposing side, about what 
happened after he put her back in the hospital. If there's 
expert opinions that something should have been done during 
that period of time I might let that go to the jury. But 
I'm troubled with this first theory. I'm, I'm having a hard 
time finding a basis— 
MR. NEWHALL: I understand. 
THE JUDGE: — for a negligent referral. 
MR. NEWHALL: Your Honor, I didn't brief it as, 
and neither did Mr. DuBois. And I'm sure we'd be happy, we'd 
be happy to do that and come back another day and discuss it 
in greater detail. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Thank you. Your reply? 
MR. DUBOIS: Yes. Just a couple of words, 
Your Honor. I know that we're a little short on time. 
THE JUDGE: Getting close, getting close. You're 
all right. 
ARGUMENT BY MR. DUBOIS 
MR. DUBOIS: With respect to this notion that this 
is a negligent referral, Counsel had every opportunity to 
brief that issue, argue that issue in the opposition. That 
was not done. And I wouldn't, there's no reason to, I think 
at this point to allow them to do supplemental briefing on 
that issue. 
I... It is our contention and this is supported by 
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the, their own expert's deposition, that once Dr. Watts makes 
the referral the decision of whether or not to go forward 
with surgery is out of his hands, he has no role in that 
decision at all. And so I, our argument would be is that 
the referral itself is not a, does not make it foreseeable 
that surgery is going to happen. It might if every referral 
led to surgery, but they don't. That's why you refer a case 
to a specialist. The referral to a specialist breaks the 
chain of causation. And it would, as you noted, it would be 
an intervening act that would break the chain of causation 
and, therefore, would not be a proximate cause of the 
surgery. And that's a, echoed in both of the depositions of 
both of the plaintiff's experts. 
You know, when faced with a patient like this it 
likely would be negligent not to refer to a specialist to 
make a decision about whether or not she should, she should 
have surgery or not. 
In any event there's, there's no case before you, 
there's no argument before you on negligent referral, and we 
believe that it's an intervening act which breaks the chain 
of causation and that's supported by the deposition testimony 
of the plaintiff's. 
Mr. Newhall noted that Dr. Barton stated that 
there, there may have been some increase in infection and an 
abscess between the 6th and the 9th. Our argument is even 
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if you assume that's true, there's still no testimony that 
says she would have been taken to surgery any sooner. 
There's no, there's no dispute to that. There is no 
testimony that says, expert testimony that says she would 
have been taken to surgery. 
THE JUDGE: Well, why do you need that? Why isn't 
expert testimony sufficient that a, something should have, 
appropriate treatment should have been undertaken through a 
treatment with antibiotics and other treatment? 
MR. DUBOIS: Well, that's a separate guestion. 
Dr. Barton didn't say that appropriate treatment wasn't 
given. He just said that there was a leak in her bowel 
between the 6th and the 9th and that led to infection and, 
and abscess. I mean, if you you assume that— 
THE JUDGE: The only, the only thing that 
Dr. Barton— 
MR. DUBOIS: That would have happened anyway. 
That's our argument. 
THE JUDGE: Dr. Barton said that it was, the 
only thing that should have been done was surgical 
intervention— 
MR. DUBOIS: Right. 
THE JUDGE: — and that takes a surgeon. 
MR. DUBOIS: And that... Well, it takes a 
surgeon. And there's no expert testimony that says that— 
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THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. DUBOIS: — second surgery would have 
happened any sooner than the 9th. 
THE JUDGE: Than the 9th. 
MR. DUBOIS: So she's going to have that abscess 
and that infection anyway. That's, that's our argument. 
There's no expert testimony that says that the surgery would 
have— 
THE JUDGE: Well, isn't the argument that a, 
Dr. Watts should have called the surgeon? 
MR. DUBOIS: There is. But our argument i s — 
THE JUDGE: And your argument is that surgeon 
might have sat until the 9th— 
MR. DUBOIS: That's, that's the— 
THE JUDGE: — before he did anything. 
MR. DUBOIS: — the first part of the argument is 
that he didn't call a surgeon. But they need the second 
part of the, the argument which is if you called a surgeon on 
the 2nd then you have a surgery on the 9th. And they don't 
have the second part. If... They, they have the issue you 
should have called the surgeon. But they don't have anybody 
that says if you'd called a surgeon she would have been 
operated on sooner than the 9th so— 
THE JUDGE: How could they ever get that? 
MR. DUBOIS: Well, it would be easy. They could, 
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1 they, a. surgeon could say if I, if I saw this patient on the 
2 6th I would have operated on her on the 6th given her 
3 condition or her presentation, given the medical records that 
4 I've, that I've reviewed. And they don't have an expert 
5 that will say that. 
6 THE JUDGE: I see. 
7 MR. DUBOIS: But even if you do assume that, that 
8 it wasn't, it was negligent not to get a surgeon on the 6th 
9 and that led to some, you know, an abscess or an infection, . 
10 there's no expert testimony that connects the abscess or 
11 infection to any injury that occurred other than just the 
12 fact that she had an abscess and infection. There's no 
13 connection between any of her post operative complications 
14 after the surgery on the 9th. So in other words, there's no 
15 testimony that connects an abscess to the things that she 
16 suffered between the 9th and the 24th when she was 
17 discharged. There's no expert testimony that establishes 
18 any connection between the abscess and the infection, to any 
19 injury that she's claiming she has now. 
20 And that's, that's our argument is that even if 
II you do have expert testimony that says there was an abscess 
22 Hand infection, you can't just say it's common sense that that 
23 prolonged her post operative recuperation. They need expert 
24 testimony to that effect and they don't have it. 
25 I) THE JUDGE: Didn't they say that the a, the 
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infection and abscesses causing the abdominal pain 
increased in severity during the period from the 6th to 
the 9th? 
MR. DUBOIS: Yes. And I'm willing to concede 
that. But they don't make any, they don't make any 
connection between abscess and infection that may have 
increased in severity to any subsequent injury or medical 
complaint, complication, anything that, that happened after 
the 9th, from the 9th to the 24th. 
And, and Your Honor, you know, that may be an issue 
of fact whether or not a, there was an increase in infection 
and maybe we go to trial on that issue. 
But we're entitled to partial summary judgment at 
the, at the least that the a, there is no connection between 
the alleged negligence and any, certainly any injury, 
complaint, any of the things that have been identified in the 
complaint or the deposition after her discharge on 
November 24th. We're entitled to, I believe, partial 
summary judgment at least on that issue. There is no expert 
testimony that connects the, the alleged negligent treatment 
to any injury, any condition, any complaint that may have 
occurred after her discharge on November 24th of 1998. 
And we are I believe also entitled to summary 
judgment or partial summary judgment on the question of was 
her condition, increased infection, abscess, if you grant 
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them that, between the 6th and the 9th, there's no connection 
between those conditions and injury that is alleged to have 
occurred between November 9th, the day of the second surgery, 
and her discharge. 
And I believe that we're also entitled to partial 
summary judgment on the issue of this wasn't Dr. Watts' call 
whether she went to surgery or not, so we can't be held 
liable for damages that might be claimed to be associated 
with the first or the second surgery. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Thank you. 
MR. DUBOIS: Thank you. 
MR. NEWHALL: Your Honor, may I point out just some 
deposition testimony? 
THE JUDGE: Yes. Go ahead. 
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. NEWHALL 
MR. NEWHALL: That didn't... Because this issue 
wasn't briefed didn't come into a guestion earlier. 
Dr. Watts in his deposition, and this issue was 
brought up in an earlier motion which never got responded to, 
a motion to exclude hearsay of Dr. Watts. But Dr. Watts in 
his deposition indicated that he saw his aunt, referred her 
to a gastroenterologist, and that the gastroenterologist 
supposedly spoke to him and said go see a surgeon, I think 
she's having intermittent bowel obstruction, send her to a 
surgeon and he'll operate, the only way we can find out is to 
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explore her. Now that's hearsay testimony. We haven't had 
the deposition of, of the gastroenterology who supposedly 
said that because he's in Florida somewhere and there's 
difficulty arranging it. 
But it seems to me that Dr. Watts clearly knew, not 
on the basis of his own knowledge perhaps, maybe, maybe so, 
maybe not, who cares, but on the basis of what this doctor 
allegedly told him that this lady was going to have 
surgery. And clearly any time someone has surgery the risk 
of complications, negligent or otherwise, is not cut off. 
So I think that answers the issue of 
foreseeability. It was easily foreseeable to Dr. Watts. 
That's, that's my argument. And that's in Dr. Watts' 
deposition. 
And actually I think we reported that in an earlier 
motion which you have but which did not get noticed up 
because there was no, no response to it. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Just a minute. 
MR. NEWHALL: I'm sorry. 
THE JUDGE: Let me ask you in response to the 
request for partial summary judgment as to any alleged claims 
or damages after November 24th. What do your experts say 
about that? 
MR. NEWHALL: Our experts didn't address that, 
I'll admit it. Dr. Salisbury, this lady's treating 
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physician, said that he treated her by way of home health 
care for a scar, not a scar, I'm sorry, an open wound, and 
that that open wound was something that commonly occurs after 
surgeries for infections. And her testimony was that she 
had that open wound for several weeks and it required several 
weeks of treat. And then we have, of course, the medical 
bills related to that. But it didn't seem necessary to have 
expert opinion to point to the open wound as being the result 
of surgery. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Thank you. I'll let you know 
and take it under advisement. Thank you very much for the 
briefing and the arguments. I need to think about it. 
MR. NEWHALL: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Appreciate the... 
Do you have anything you would like to add, 
Mr. Fishier? 
MR. FISHLER: To this motion, no, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: I know you're here but if you'd like 
to—. 
pending. 
MR. FISHLER: Well, there are other motions 
THE JUDGE: Oh, I thought we were just going to 
hear the summary judgment today and then everything is 
triggered on that. If the case is thrown out it's thrown out 
as to Dr. Watts. 
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MR. FISHLER: Yes. But there's another issue 
and it's a very simple one. It's kind of after hearing 
these eloquent arguments my issues are kind of penny-anti I 
admit. 
THE JUDGE: Well, go ahead. I'm sorry if I 
overlooked that. I don't mean that in any way. I was just 
assuming that you were here to observe but I didn't see. We 
have Dr. Kohler's motions today as well? 
MR. FISHLER: Well, I don't know if it's 
Dr. Kohler's motions or a — 
MR. NEWHALL: Your motion was for expert fees. 
MR. FISHLER: Yes. And one of the, and it's in the 
shortness of time— 
THE JUDGE: And we have 17, 17 pleadings here so 
I'm— 
MR. FISHLER: I will be kind enough to argue 
Mr. Newhall's side of the argument. 
THE JUDGE: Go ahead. 
ARGUMENT BY MR. FISHLER: 
MR. FISHLER: It's the same thing we've talked 
about before on other cases, Your Honor. 
Both doctors have what we call retained experts 
that you pay that review the documents, and they have a 
certain expertise and they testify. We both, Dr. Watts and 
Dr. Kohler have identified themselves as experts because we 
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want to be in a, we don't want to be in a position, what 
Mr. Newhall is saying that he has one expert radiologist and 
one expert surgeon, we're only entitled to one surgeon and 
one radiologist. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. FISHLER: We do that. But if we're limited in 
that way, if the two physicians are limited in that way they 
cannot testify that they adhered to the standard of care. 
It's an argument I made to Your Honor— 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. FISHLER: — some months ago on another case. 
THE JUDGE: Let me, let me... I understand your 
argument and I've ruled on this. 
Counsel, let me talk to you about this. 
MR. NEWHALL: Yes, sir. I'm, I'm' simply.. . I 
guess I didn't- do a very good job arguing. I'm not taking 
you out to lunch anymore. 
THE JUDGE: No, no. I understand this argument 
and I've had it before and so I — 
MR. NEWHALL: The argument is— 
THE JUDGE: — want to talk to you about it 
because— 
MR. NEWHALL: — for the payment of expert fees, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: What's that? 
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MR. NEWHALL: The argument is only for payment of 
expert fees. I have no problem with him naming both his 
doctor and— 
THE JUDGE: Oh, okay. 
MR. FISHLER: I thought that— 
THE JUDGE: I thought that was the rub. 
MR. FISHLER: I thought that was the rub too. 
Now the next issue— 
MR. DUBOIS: Can I weigh in here just briefly? 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. DUBOIS: There is a pending motion— 
THE JUDGE: There is. 
MR. DUBOIS: — that was filed by the plaintiff 
to limit us to one expert and or to add additional experts. 
And I think that's what Mr. Fishier was just speaking to. 
THE JUDGE: Right. But he says he has no problem 
with it. 
MR. DUBOIS: Are you withdrawing that motion? 
ARGUMENT BY MR. NEWHALL 
MR. NEWHALL: That was, that was for Friedenberg's 
testimony only. Oh, I'm sorry. Okay. 
If that was, if that was for that, for that, both 
motions and you're prepared to say look they both, they get 
both guys, that's fine. 
THE JUDGE: I'm not prepared. I want to talk to 
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you about it. 
MP NEWHALL: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: I want alk to me and persuade 
me, 
MR. NEWHALL: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Here's the way I see 
this 
MR. NEWHALL: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: I see that the doctors get to testify 
about the standard of care as experts. And they also get to 
call in expert witnesses so that their testimony isn't the 
only testimony going to the jury. That doesn't mean now 
that the plaintiff gets two experts. It means that the 
plaintiff gets an expert as well to support the plaintiff's 
theory of the case. It isn't a question of counting 
experts. It's a question of having each side having an 
expert witness. 
The doctor is by very definition an expert. And 
that's the way it is with a lawyer on trial, that's the way 
it is with a doctor or accountant on trial, they get to say 
about their performance and whether or not it fell below the 
acceptable standard of care. 
MR. NEWHALL: I h ave n o p rob1e m wi th, w11h 
's lucid argument. 
My argument is that certainly they can testify that 
tono 
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their care was within the standard of care. 
THE JUDGE: uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. NEWHALL: But that's it. They cannot go into 
on direct anything more than was your care within the 
standard of care. Yes. Beyond that they rely on their 
retained expert to explain why it was within the standard of 
care, to explain what it was that the standard of care 
involves, to explain where the standard of care might have 
been breached and wasn't breached. 
Now, if I choose to go into that on cross then on 
redirect they can open it up again. 
But my point is that they are limited to answering 
the question that Mr. Fishier, Mr. DuBois both say is the 
only question they want to ask, was your care within the 
standard. For everything else related to the standard of 
care and negligence they rely on their retained expert. 
They cannot explain to the jury. Because in my view that's 
prejudicial to have two doctors up there saying not only was 
I within the standard of care, but the standard of care 
involves this, this, this and this and these are the things I 
did, so forth and so on and so on. And then to have it 
buttressed by another expert, I think that's impermissible. 
I think that they're limited to the questions that 
Mr. DuBois and Mr. Fishier say they want to ask only, was 
your care within the standard of care. Fine. Then if I 
i-M~./^^-1TTi-ni-p\Tl\Tr,C 
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cross examine anyone them on the standard of care and 
Mr. Fishier and Mr. DuBois care to come in on redirect and 
e1icit further testimony, that1s not bu11ressing in my 
view 
But I think that I get two experts to explain the 
standard of care if they get two experts to explain the 
standard of care. That's my view. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Thank you. 
Okay. I disagree. I think the doctor should be 
able to explain his conduct, explain what happened, the 
•i rcams Lances, the medicine involved, I he, I ho pnl lent 's 
treatment, why he did what he did or she did what she did 
under the circumstances, and what the doctor feels was the 
appropriate treatment and why. To limit and restrict that 
party's testimony to simply a narrow, funneled view of the 
case denies them the opportunity to defend themselves. 
they should have their day in court as well as your client 
gets to explain in her point of view what happened to her and 
what damage it caused her and go through the circumstances in 
her life as well. 
So both sides get to be able to explain their, 
their conduct:. 
MR. NEWHALL: I accept your argument, Your Honor. 
ARGUMENT BY MR. FISHLER 
MR. FISHLER: One last item, Your Honor 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
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He has previously deposed Dr. Kohler as a fact 
witness in this case. I don't know if Dr. Kohler was a party 
at that time or not. He apparently, I'll take Mr. Newhall's 
word for that. He now wants to redepose Dr. Kohler as an 
expert. And in my view he's making, this is a lot to do 
about nothing or very little. A tempest in a tea cup. I'm 
saying if he wants to take two hours of Dr. Kohler's time he 
ought to pay a fair amount for those two hours if he's 
deposing him. He's already deposed him as a fact witness, 
we've got that. Now he wants to talk about this expert 
thing. If he does we just want a fair rate and my, I would 
suggest it would be the lowest rate of any expert so far 
who's been deposed rather than just picking just a number out 
of the hat. 
THE JUDGE: Counsel? 
MR. FISHLER: Just for the deposition time. 
THE JUDGE: You want to take his deposition twice 
and the first time you didn't feel that maybe you covered 
what you needed to cover regarding his expertise? Is that 
what I'm hearing? 
MR. NEWHALL: No, Your Honor. I, the first time 
I didn't ask him his opinions about his own standard of 
care— 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. NEWHALL: — because I didn't expect that he 
nrvrrDrp DPHP WTPnTNHS 
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THE JUDGE: You didn't expect him to be a 
defendant? You mean an expert? 
MR. NEWHALL: Correct. He was a fact witness and 
J I didn't expect he would b e — 
THE JUDGE: You hadn'1 sued him at that time? 
MR NEWHALL: Correct. 
THE JUDGE: Oh. 
MR. NEWHALL: The complaint was amended— 
THE JUDGE: I see. 
MR. NEWHALL: — to add Dr. Kohler. 
THE JUDGE: I see. 
MR. NEWHALL: So, and it was after his deposition 
that I did that, partly based on his deposition but more 
based on further information that came to light from my own 
experts. 
THE JUDGE: All right. i understand. Anything 
else? 
MR FISHLER: I think Your Honor understands the 
issue. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Yes. I'm going to allow him 
to take a second deposition at no cost, and understanding 
that he didn't understand fully the, the extent of his 
involvement, and he's amended him in the complaint and 
brought him into the complaint as a defendant and may 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
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examine him on the standard of care and his expertise. 
Okay? 
MR. NEWHALL: Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. Anything else that I 
overlooked? 
MR. FISHLER: What about preparing an order, 
Your Honor? 
THE JUDGE: That would be great. Who wants to do 
that? I'd love to have that done. I've ruled both ways. 
Let's have— 
MR. DUBOIS: This is typically where Mr. Fishier 
says, DuBois, take care of it. 
MR. FISHLER: I don't think I took up a lot of the 
Court's time today so I just think that's somebody else's 
job. But I can do it if— 
THE JUDGE: I know. But the only thing I've 
really ruled on is what you brought up so, isn't that 
right? 
MR. FISHLER: That's true, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. You prepare the 
appropriate order. 
MR. FISHLER: I'll do it. 
MR. NEWHALL: Your Honor, can we get a, can we get 
a further date? Because even if Mr., Dr. Watts is kicked out 
we're going to need some more time to set pretrial and so 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
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forth for Dr. Kohler who remained. 
THE JUDGE: Let's wait and see. I'm not going to 
be the judge after the first of July on this case so we all 
need to know that. I'm going to rule on what's before me. 
I'm going into criminal felony cases the first of July. 
Judge Taylor is taking the civil calendar so we'll leave that 
up to I!m going to decide what we have to decide and 
then we'll let you talk to him about that. 
MR. NEWHALL: Thank you. 
MR. DUBOIS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you all for coming. I'll get 
this decision out as soon as possible. 
MR. NEWHALL: Thank you. 
MR. DUBOIS: Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: We'll be in a short recess. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION 
) 
) SS. 
) 
I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify 
that I received the electronically recorded video #104 in 
the matter of JOHNSON VS. WATTS, hearing date June 16, 2003, 
and that I transcribed it into typewriting and that a full, 
true and correct transcription of said hearing so recorded 
and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered 
1 through 60, inclusive except where it is indicated that the 
tape recording was inaudible. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 27th day of 
December, 2003. 
>-'"/) 
'(t<^<st C&f' 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
License 23^102811-7801 
Notary Public, Comm Exp 9-24-04 
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CLARK NEWHALL (#7091) 
320 West 200 South, Suite 100B 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3757 
Mail To: P.O. Box 284 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0284 
(801) 363-8888 
Pax (801) 596-8888 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
//- (bl'tp Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LUCY JOHNSON aka LUCY MacLEOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY WATTS MD and DOUGLAS 
KOHLERMD, 
Defendants. 
ORDER CERTIFYING JUDGMENT 
AS FINAL 
Civil No. 010400391 
Division VII 
Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Rule 54(b) Motion for Order Directing 
Entry of Final Judgment filed with this Court on August 6, 2003. Defendant filed its 
Memorandum in Opposition on August 20, 2003 and this Court issued its Memorandum 
Decision dated October 1, 2003. Based upon the facts in this case and for the reasons set forth 
in the Court's Memorandum Decision and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Order 
Granting Gary Watts MD's Motion For Summary Judgment dismissing all claims against 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendant Watts and dated July 22, 2003 be certified as a FINAL .JUDGMENT pursuant to 
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
of /CiGrQ . , 20 £ 3> 
James R. Taylor, Judge 
Fourth District Court 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on 0 Q Z j , 20 A- / , I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing ORDER CERTIFYING JUDGMENT AS FINAL 
to be served by depositing in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Curtis Drake 
Scott DuBois 
1 Snell & Wilmer 
1
 15 W. South Temple 
Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Phillip Fishier 
Strong & Hanni 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
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 Ordei Granting Gary Watts, MD's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 815-7) 
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FILED 
Prepared by: 
CURTIS J. DRAKE [A0910] 
SCOTT A. DuBOIS [A7510] 
TROY L. BOOHER [A9419] 
SNELL & WILMER 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 257-1900 
Fax No.: (801) 257-1800 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Gary Watts, MD 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
&-
Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LUCY MacLEOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY WATTS, M.D. and DOUGLAS 
KOHLER, M.D, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING GARY WATTS, 
M.D.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 010400391 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
This matter is before the Court on Gary Watts, M.D.'s Motion for Summary Judgment 
(the "Motion"), which was filed on January 29, 2003 together with his Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff served her Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Motion together with the Affidavit of Darwood Fiance, M.D. on February 12, 2003. Gary Watts, 
M.D. filed his Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on February 21, 
2003. The Court heard oral argument regarding the Motion on June 16, 2003. 
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Based upon the record of this matter, the argument at the hearing on the Motion and for 
the reasons set forth in Gary Watts, M.D.'s Motion and good cause appearing therefor; 
IT F HF.RDn ORDi.RKDa r ': - ;: 
1. Gary Watts, M.D.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. • 
2. All causes of action against Gary Watts, M.D. are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
DATED t h i s j ? day of pjsl ^ 
'* 
, 2003. 
B¥^S£OURT 
m rafiTocicr pncoon 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 9 n day of July, 2003, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was mailed, first class mail, postage prepaid to: 
S. Clark Newhall, Esq. 
Law Office of Clark Newhall, M.D., J.D., L.C. 
320 West 200 South, Suite 100B 
P.O. Box 284 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Lucy MacLeod 
Phillip R. Fishier, Esq. 
Catherine M. Larson, Esq. 
STRONG &HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Douglas Kohler, MD. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LUCY MacLEOD, 
Plaintiff*, 
vs. 
GARY WATTS, M.D. and 
DOUGLAS KOHLER, M.D., 
Defendant*. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 010400391 
Date: June 27, 2003 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Before the Court is Defendant Gary Watts, M.D. Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Court, having heard arguments on the motion and having reviewed all relevant memoranda, now 
grants Defendant3 s Motion. 
FACTS 
1. In October of 1998, Ms. MacLeod consulted with defendant Gary Watts, M.D. for 
undiagnosed abdominal pain. 
2. Dr. Watts referred Ms. MacLeod to Dr. Kohler, a general surgeon. 
3. Dr. Kohler evaluated Ms. MacLeod and determined that she needed to have surgery to 
have her gall bladder removed. 
4. Dr. Kohler performed the surgery on November 3, 1998, resulting in a small perforation 
to her bowel. 
5. Dr. Watts did not participate in the operation. 
6. Ms. MacLeod continued to experience abdominal pain in the days following surgery. 
7~1StnceT)f^toW 
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8. On November 6, 1998, Dr. Watts admitted Ms. MacLeod to Utah Valley Regional 
Medical Center and assumed her care from November 6- November 9. 
9. On November 9, Dr. Kohler returned to town and resumed the care of Ms. MacLeod. 
10. Dr. Kohler found Ms. MacLeod to have extensive abdominal wall cellulites for which he 
re-operated, finding an intra-abdominal abscess. 
11. Dr. Kohler removed a portion of the Ms. MacLeod's small intestine. 
12. Ms. MacLeod was discharged from the hospital on November 24, 1998. 
ANALYSIS AND RULING 
This suit results from Ms. MacLeod's claim that Dr. Watts was negligently cared for her in at 
least two aspects. First, that Gary Watts was negligent in referring the Ms. MacLeod to a surgeon 
without consulting her primary care physician. Second, Dr. Watts was negligent in consulting a 
surgeon for the increasing abdominal pain Ms. MacLeod told him about on November 6. Dr. 
Watts brings his motion for Summary Judgment arguing as a matter of law that there is no 
causation. 
Dr. Watt's Referral to a General Surgeon 
Dr. Watts brings this motion arguing that as a matter of law his actions regarding Ms. 
MacLeod were not negligent. The Plaintiff argues that Dr. Watts was negligent in referring the 
Plaintiff to Dr. Kohler without first consulting the Plaintiffs primary care physician. 
Summary Judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). To establish a 
-2-
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duty of care; (2) defendant breached that duty; (3) defendant's breach of that duty was the actual 
and proximate cause of plaintiff s injuries; and (4) that plaintiff suffered damages as a result of 
defendant's breach of duty. Dalley v. Utah Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 791 P.2d 407 (Utah 1990). 
The question before the court is whether Dr. Watts referral was the proximate cause of the injuries 
suffered by the Plaintiff during and after surgery. Where this is a medical malpractice case, expert 
testimony is required to establish that the defendant physician was the proximate cause of 
plaintiffs injuries. Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, 930 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah App. 1997). A court 
may rule as a matter of law on the issue of proximate cause if, "there is no evidence to establish a 
causal connection, thus leaving causation to jury speculation." Bansasine v. Bodell, 927 P.2d 675, 
675 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Dr. Hance, the Plaintiffs radiology expert, acknowledged in his deposition that the decision to 
take a patient to surgery is made by the surgeon. Dr. Hance testified that Dr. Watts "had nothing 
to do with that decision." Dr. Anaise, the Plaintiffs expert surgeon, agreed that Dr. Watts, as a 
radiologist, did not have input into the decision to perform surgery. Because Dr. Watts' 
involvment with Ms. MacLeods' care ended with his referral to an experienced surgeon, Dr. 
Kohler, there is no causal connection between any harm Ms. MacLeod suffered from surgery and 
Dr. Watts initial referral. Where Dr. Kohler acted independent of Dr. Watts, there is a break in the 
chain of causation. Ms. MacLeod has failed to provide evidence sufficient to establish even a 
prima facie case of negligence. 
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As a matter of law, this court finds that Dr. Watt's referral was not the cause of any damage 
suffered by the plaintiff. 
Interim Treatment 
Dr. Watts argues further that Ms. MacLeod has failed to provide expert testimony that any 
complication she suffered was actually related to a "delay" in surgery between November 6 and 
November 9. Ms. MacLeod argues that Dr. Watt's failure to consult a surgeon on November 6 
resulted in increased infection/abscess causing an additional abdominal pain. Defendant also 
argues that this failure increased the risk of complications as well. 
Ms. MacLeod did not provide expert testimony that Dr. Watt's failure to consult with Dr. 
Kohler until November 9 actually caused specific complications. There is no evidence showing 
that surgery should have, or would have, been performed if Dr. Watts had contacted the surgeon 
earlier. The facts as provided in affidavit do not establish that Dr. Watts' actions caused any 
additional damages to the plaintiff not already remaining from the first surgery. Accordingly, 
because there is no evidence of causation, the court hereby finds that, as a matter of law, Dr. 
Watts was not negligent and grants his motion for Summary Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff has failed to provide expert testimony that Dr. Watts referral to a surgeon 
caused injuries to the plaintiff during and after surgery. The Plaintiff has also failed to demonstrate 
that the care provided between November 6 and November 9 actually caused a specific injury in 
addition to those caused by the first surgery. 
-4-
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Therefore, the Court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact exists, and Gary Watts 
M.D. is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Dr. Watts3 counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it for the 
Court's signature. 
DATED this 7 day of _ 
BY THE COURT 
{ry ^. jT'* U"* 
STEVEN L. HAKSEN5:IUDGE-.,'; . "..'/', % 
•:\
 4 V-"1 ' " . r* < \ r / 
• • . . . / / 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 010400391 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail SCOTT A DUBOIS 
ATTORNEY DEF 
15 W SOUTH TEMPLE STE 12 00 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
Mail PHILIP R FISHLER 
ATTORNEY DEF 
9 EXCHANGE PLACE 
STE 600 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Mail CLARK NEWHALL 
ATTORNEY PLA 
320 W 200 S STE 100B 
PO BOX 2 84 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84110-0284 
Dated this _T day of ,jglu , 2 0fg . 
iHDQ Ar7er. 
Deputy Court? Clerk 
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4TH DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DEPT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LUCY JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
GARY WATTS MD Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Case No: 010400391 MP 
Judge: STEVEN L. HANSEN 
Date: June 16, 2 0 03 
Clerk: taras 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): CLARK NEWHALL 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SCOTT A DUBOIS 
PHILIP R FISHLER 
Video 
Tape Number: 104 Tape Count: 9:07 
HEARING 
TAPE: 104 COUNT: 
This matter comes 
Plaintiff's Motion 
9:07 
before the court 
for Arbitration, 
for oral argument on 
Plaintiff's Motion to Limit 
Experts, Kohler's Motion for Expert Fees and Gary Watts, M.D. 's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Mr. Newhall withdraws plaintiff's motion for arbitration. Mr. 
Newhall requests the court hear argument on plaintiff's motion to 
strike deposition testimony of defendant Watts' expert Marvin J. 
Friedenberg M.D. Mr. Dubois objects to arguing motion. 
The Court grants objection and will not hear argument on 
plaintiff's motion to strike deposition testimony of defendant 
Watts' expert Marvin J. Friedenberg M.D. today. 
Mr. Dubois argues Gary Watts, M.D.'s motion for summary judgment. 
iYbr.—NBwhnii-re-spx^ ndB^ : Fxnal r ep±y~iJ7^Mrr~Dnbu±B^—Mrr~Newfrairl 
points out deposition testimony. The Court takes Gary Watts, 
M.D.'s motion for summary judgment under advisement. 
Mr. Fishier addresses plaintiff's motion to limit experts and 
Kohler's motion for expert fees. Mr. Fishier argues motion to 
Page 1 
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Case No: 010400391 
Date: Jun 16, 2003 
limit experts. • Mr. Newhall responds. The Court denies 
plaintiff's motion to limit experts. 
Mr. Fishier argues Kohler's motion for expert fees. Mr. Newhall 
responds. The Court denies Kohler's motion for expert fees and 
allows Mr. Newhall to take Kohler's deposition at no cost. Mr. 
Fishier will prepare the order. 
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F. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Watts' 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 310-337) 
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CLARK NEWHALL (#7091) 
320 West 200 South, Suite 100B 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3757 
Mail To: P.O. Box 284 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0284 
(801)363-8888 
Fax (801)596-8888 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LUCY MacLEOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY WATTS MDetal, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT 
WATTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 010400391 
Judge Steven Hansen 
Plaintiff submits this Memorandum in opposition to defendant Gary Watts' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Defendant Watts bases his motion on the supposed lack of expert testimony 
to establish causation of plaintiffs damages. Plaintiff contends that the deposition and the 
affidavit of Dr. Hance, radiology expert, and the deposition of Dr. Barton, co-defendant Kohler's 
surgical expert, establish that Dr. Watts5 negligent medical treatment of plaintiff from November 
5 through November 9,1998 caused damage to plamtiff in the form of worsening infection 
which actually occurred, increased risk, of complications which actually occurred, additional 
hospitalization and increased medical bills. With material facts in dispute, defendant Watts' 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. 
BACKGROUND 
uG0337 
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Plaintiff sought the advice of her nephew, defendant Gary Watts MD, a radiologist at 
Utah Valley Hospital, regarding a long-standing complaint of abdominal pain on or about 
October 30, 1998. After perfomiing various x-ray tests, Watts referred plaintiff to a surgeon, co-
defendant Kohler. Kohler performed a laparoscopic cholecystectomy on November 3, 1998 and 
discharged plaintiff from the hospital on November 4,1998. On or about November 5and again 
on November 6, plaintiff telephoned Watts complaining of abdominal pain. Watts admitted 
plaintiff to hospital on November 6 where he was her only physician from November 6 through 
Kohler's return to town on November 9. On November 9, Kohler re-operated on plaintiff, 
discovering a perforated viscus (leaking bowel) and intra-abdominal infection in the vicinity of 
the entry site for the laparoscopic instrument. 
ADDITONAL MATERIAL FACTS 
1) Dr. Darwood Hance, plaintiffs radiology expert, stated that he has experience in the . 
expected postoperative course of patients who have undergone laparoscopic cholecystectomy, 
the surgery plaintiff had on November 3. Exhibit A, Hance deposition 39:23-40:22. 
2) Dr. Hance stated that he had experience in evaluating postoperative laparoscopic 
cholecystectomy patients with abdominal pain who are referred to him for consideration of 
bowel leak, the complication that plaintiff suffered. Ex. A 40:11. 
3) Dr. Hance stated that the negligent failure of Dr. Watts to consult a surgeon after the 
second call from plaintiff on November 6 "resulted in damage to Mrs. MacLeod." Ex. A 36:13. 
4) Specifically, Dr. Hance stated that Dr. Watts' negligent delay in consulting a surgeon 
resulted in "this large abscess that she [the plaintiff] had." Ex. A 44:6-11,44:20-45:2. 
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5) In his affidavit, Dr. Hance stated that Dr. Watts' negligent delay caused additional pain 
and suffering, increased intra-abdominal infection, additional hospitalization and additional 
hospital bills. Exhibit B, Hance Affidavit, J 7(l)-(m). 
6) Dr. Hance stated that Dr. Watts breached the standard of care when he "interposed*' 
himself as plaintiffs primary physician and undertook to diagnose and refer plaintiff for 
treatment of abdominal pain. Ex. A, 22;:1-19, 25:18-24. 
7) Dr. Hance stated that Dr. Watts' negligent failure to consult plaintiffs primary care 
physician, Dr. Salisbury, was followed by a referral to a surgeon that would not have been made 
if Dr. Salisbury had been consulted. Ex. A, 27:9-23, Ex. B 7(g)-(h). 
8) Dr. Hance and Dr. Barton, defendant Kohler's expert surgeon, agree that the perforation 
of the plaintiffs bowel occurred at the time of the November 3 surgery. Ex. A, 40:24-41:23; 
Exhibit C, Barton deposition, 26:12-27:9. 
9) Dr. Barton stated that in the period from November 5 to November 9, plaintiff probably 
suffered an increase in her intra-abdominal infection. Ex. C, 80:5-25. 
10) Dr. Barton stated that the appropriate treatment upon recognition of an intra-abdominal 
infection in plaintiff s circumstances is prompt surgical treatment. Ex. C, 79:10-24. 
11) Dr. Barton opined that a surgeon should have been consulted about plaintiffs abdominal 
pain when it was increasing after November 5. Ex. C, 87:11-88:2. 
12) Dr. Barton opined that the failure to consult a surgeon regarding plaintiffs increasing 
abdominal pain resulted in failure to timely perform the appropriate surgical treatment Ex.C, 
91:9-92:11. 
3 
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13) During her hospitalization from November 6 through November 24, plaintiff suffered the 
complications of hypoglycemia, fluid overload and pneumothorax (collapsed lung.) Exhibit D, 
Deposition of Dr. Corneia, 7:10-16, 9:16-22,20:5-16. 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment can only be rendered if 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. The party opposing a summary judgment motion "is entitled to have the court 
survey the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom in the light most-
favorable to him." Morris v. Famswoith Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (1953); Thompson 
v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d434 
(Utah 1982), 
Accordingly, summary judgment is a drastic measure and a party seeking to dispose of 
another's interests in this manner bears a heavy burden of proof. Defendant Watts is unable to 
meet this burden because there are disputed issues of fact. The fact in dispute is whether Watts' 
negligence caused damage to plaintiff. Defendant's motion has focused exclusively on damages 
that may or may not have occurred after hospitalization, ignoring completely the damage that 
occurred during or as a result of surgery and hospitalization. 
Plaintiffs radiology expert, Dr. Hance, established his expertise to render an opinion as 
to the treatment performed by Dr. Watts; his expertise in this area is undisputed. He opined that 
the negligence of Dr. Watts had at least two aspects. First, Dr. Watts referred plaintiff to a 
surgeon without consulting plaintiffs primary care physician, Dr. Salisbury. Second, Dr. Watts 
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failed to consult a surgeon for the increasing abdominal pain plaintiff told him about on 
November 6. 
Dr. Hance states that the surgery performed on November 3 the laparoscopic 
cholecystectomy, was completely unnecessary and no surgical referral was medically indicated. 
He opines that a surgical referral would not have been made if Dr. Salisbury had been consulted 
by Dr. Watts. Both Dr. Hance and Dr. Barton agree that the perforated viscus (bowel leak) that 
led to all of plaintiffs subsequent injuries occurred at the time of the laparoscopic surgery. It is 
reasonable to infer that the plaintiff would have suffered no injury if Watts had not negligently 
referred plaintiff to Kohler, the surgeon. Even though Dr. Watts may not have made the decision 
to perform a laparoscopic cholecystectomy on plaintiff, absent a referral to a surgeon it is 
reasonable to infer that the plaintiff would never had any abdominal surgery in the first place and 
therefore would not have suffered the initial injury. Plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of that 
reasonable inference. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, these statements and. 
inferences alone are enough to establish a disputed fact as to damages caused by Watts' 
negligence. 
Both Dr. Hance and Dr. Barton opined that the only appropriate treatment for plaintiffs 
condition was surgical intervention. Because Dr. Watts, a non-surgpon, chose to treat plaintiff 
himself rather than consult a surgeon on November 6, she had no appropriate surgical treatment 
until November 9. Both Dr. Hance and Dr. Barton opined that the intra-abdominal 
infection/abscess causing plaintiffs abdominal pain increased in severity during the period from 
November 6 to November 9. In addition to increasing severity of the infection, Dr. Barton also 
5 
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stated that the risk of complications increased as well, and plaintiff did in fact suffer 
complications during her hospitalization. It is reasonable to infer that these complications would 
not have occurred with prompt surgical treatment. Dr. Hance identified two other aspects of 
damage caused by the delay in treatment: increased duration of hospitalization and increased cost 
of hospitalization. It is reasonable to infer that the increased severity of the intra-abdominal 
infection caused by the delay led to the increased cost and duration of hospitalization. Plaintiff is 
entitled to the benefit of these reasonable inferences. 
CONCLUSION 
Watts' motion relies upon the supposed lack of connection between Watts' negligence 
and any damages following plaintiff's second hospitalization, completely ignoring the damages 
that occurred at surgeiy and during subsequent hospitalization. Viewed in the light most 
favorable to plaintiff, the facts connecting Watts' negligent referral to a surgeon and the initial 
bowel injury raise a disputed issue of material fact that is sufficient to defeat this motion. Going 
further, it is reasonable to infer that the delay in surgical treatment caused by Watts' negligence 
resulted in additional damages to plaintiff. There are genuine issues of material fact in this case 
and the defendant's motion should be denied. 
DATED this j l^ day of Q ^ A * ' ^ , 2pO > 
ss/ v ...y^uX; A jLiL L 
Clark Newhall 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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1 don't anymore. 
2 Q. 1 had begun to follow up on your explanation of 
3 your opinions, Dr. Hance, by asking about the first point 
4 in time which you believe Dr. Watts deviated from the 
5 standard of care. You told me in essence that was the 
6 beginning the referral process, if you will, mat led up 
7 to surgery. 
8 When is Hie next point in time when in your 
9 opinion Dr. Watts deviated from the standard of care? 
10 A. When she called him after - well, the first 
11 time she called him after she went home he did consult 
12 Dr. Kohler and, I think, got Dr. Kohler involved in that. 
13 And certainly that was - he was an intermediary. But 
14 that was not inappropriate. 
15 Called Dr. Kohler and say "What should I do? My 
16 aunt's having trouble." 
17 And Dr. Kohler gave the instructions, which he 
18 relayed to his aunt. 
19 That was certainly within the appropriate ream. 
20 The second time when — 
21 Q. May 1 stop you there. 
22 I want to make sure in the sense of chronology 
23 we understand when we are talking about, 
24 What is your understanding of when that first 
25 contact took place between Ms. MacLeod and Dr. Watts? 
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1 A. That was after she had gone home. It was the 
2 first call that she was having pain. And Dr. Kohler got 
3 involved with it at that point appropriately. 
4 Q. But when did that call take place? 
5 A. I don't remember the exact date. I think it was 
6 probably about the 5th because she went home on the 4th I 
7 believe. 
8 Q. What is the source of your information about 
9 when that call took place? 
10 A. That was in Dr. Watts' deposition. I'm pretty 
11 sure. I may be off one day on the date. But it was the 
12 first time she called he consulted Dr. Kohler. 
13 And I forget what he advised — some laxative or 
14 something for her. And that was his job. But 
15 Dr. Kohler's job to advise what his aunt should do. 
16 Q. Then what is the next point in time at which you 
17 believe Dr. Watts fell below the standard of care in 
18 whatever he did or didn't do? 
19 A. That was the next time when she called and she 
20 said she was worse. And that's when he perfomied an 
21 X ray on her and started, you know, admitting her into 
22 the hospital and treating her as a primary care physician 
23 or as a surgeon. 1 don't know which. But not certainly 
24 as a radiologist. 
25 He went beyond the realm of the radiologist. 
r 
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1 Q. What is your understanding of when this next 
2 call took place? 
3 A. That probably was on the 6th, I think, is when 
4 he admitted her. 
5 Q. So do you have any criticism of Dr. Watts 
6 between that first call, which you believe took place on 
7 the 5th, and the second call which led to the admission 
8 on November 6? 
9 A. That's when I think he got out of line because 
10 that call should have been deferred to the surgeon who 
11 had treated her, who knew what was going on in her belly. 
12 And that failure to defer to the surgeon or to 
13 the surgeon's associate who was taking the calls resulted 
14 in damage to Ms. MacLeod. 
15 Q. What is it, sir, that you believe required 
16 Dr. Watts to either get Dr. Kohler or his assistant, 
17 Dr. Fullmer, involved on the 6th at or near the time 
18 Dr. Watts admitted her to the hospital? 
19 A. That's because they had operated on the patient. 
20 They knew about the adhesions. And they knew about the 
21 dangers of perforation of the small bowel, which is a 
22 known complication which every surgeon who does 
23 laparoscopic surgery knows. 
24 And they would have responded differently to 
25 that initial time when she was admitted. They'd have 
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1 come in ~ had they been called, they'd have come in, 
2 checked her out, said — 
3 MR. F1SHLER: I'm going to have to object on the 
4 basis of foundation, any opinion concerning standard of 
5 care of a surgeon. 
6 Q. BY MR. DRAKE: Dr. Hance, what I'm trying to get 
7 at, sir, is some sense of whether your opinion is based 
8 upon Ms. MacLeod's condition at the time this call was 
9 placed or whether it was simply the fact she was a 
10 post-laparoscopic surgery patient who was calling 
11 Dr. Watts with a problem. 
12 Do you understand that distinction? 
13 MS. MAGID: Object. That's a compound question. 
14 If you could simplify it, that would be great. 
15 Q. BY MR. DRAKE: You can go ahead and answer, 
16 Dr. Hance. 
17 A. Yes. It involved that she was a post-op 
18 laparoscopic cholecystectomy patient and therefore in 
19 that early post-op period you're looking for surgical 
20 complications. 
21 And yes, her condition was that she was having 
22 increasing pain. 
23 Q. Let me get at it this way, sir. 
24 Is it your belief that any call from someone 
25 who's undergone the procedure that Ms. MacLeod did on 
10 (Pages 34 to 37) 
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EXHIBIT A 
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1 Let's start with the first. And in terms of 
2 chronology or sequence of events, what was the first 
3 point in time in your opinion where Dr. Watts deviated 
4 from the standard of care? 
5 A, He undertook to get involved in her care without 
6 consulting or receiving the permission of the doctor who 
7 had been treating her for a long period of time, 
8 Dr. Salisbury. 
9 In other words, he lacked all of the information 
10 that Dr. Salisbury had. 
11 He didn't review her medical records from 
12 Dr. Salisbury, did not talk to Dr. Salisbury about her 
13 problems and the workup that she had had, the medications 
14 she had been on in the past 
i 5 And that's below the standard for somebody in 
16 family practice or primary care medicine, which he was 
17 practicing at that time, and certainly out of line for a 
18 radiologist to even get involved with anybody, especially 
19 a relative. 
20 Q. What is your understanding of the circumstances 
21 that led to Ms. MacLeod first contacting Dr, Watts to 
22 request that he become involved in trying to secure some 
23 treatment or care for the problems she was having in late 
24 1998? 
25 A. My understanding was that she made him aware -
Page 23 
1 MS. MAGID: Object That implies facts not in 
2 evidence. 
3 There's nothing in evidence to ascertain how she 
4 contacted the radiologist in the first place. 
5 MR. DRAKE: Perhaps part of my question was not 
6 heard on your end. 
7 My question was what is his understanding, which 
8 really doesn't go to anything that's in evidence 
9 whatsoever. 
10 Did you not hear that? 
11 MS. MAGID: Ifs the same objection. 
12 MR. DRAKE: That's fine. We'll move on. 
13 Q. Go ahead, Dr. Hance. 
14 A. My understanding is Dr. Watts, because he was 
15 related to her, became aware that she had been suffering 
16 from abdominal pain for three years and that she had 
17 undergone numerous tests and the pain was continuing. 
18 Q. What is your understanding of the first thing 
19 that Dr. Watts did in response to that inquiry from 
20 Ms. MacLeod to attempt to secure treatment or assistance 
21 for her? 
22 A. It was my understanding that he contacted 
23 Dr. Kohler and arranged for, also, his performance of the 
24 Hida scan. 
25 Q. Is it your understanding that Dr. Kohler 
f 
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1 performed the Hida scan? 
2 A. No. Dr. Watts performed the Hida scan. When I. 
3 said "his," I meant Dr, Watts himself 
4 Q. Were you - are you aware of any other 
5 physicians who consulted on Ms. MacLeod's case prior to 
6 the surgery that Dr. Kohler did on November 3? 
7 A. 1 don't know exactly what the time was of the 
8 other doctor whose spelling we had a problem. But I 
9 think his was after the surgery, not before. 
10 And I think the answer is no. 
11 Q. Would it change any of your opinions, sir, if in 
12 fact there were other physicians who were involved in 
13 consulting on Ms. MacLeod's case to determine whether or 
14 not surgery was appropriate under the circumstances? 
15 MS. MAGID: Objection. It's a hypothetical that 
16 doesn't call into question all of the facts that would be 
17 necessary for him to be able to answer the hypothetical. 
18 Q. BY MR. DRAKE: Go ahead, sir. 
19 A. Yeah. I 'm-
20 Which doctor are you referring to is this? 
21 Q. Any, sir. I'm just trying to probe the extent 
22 of your knowledge about the case and the basis for your 
23 opinions. 
24 A. I'm aware she was also seeing an OB/GYN doctor, 
25 Dr. Danee Young-Hawkins. But that was not at the time of 
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1 her admission. j 
2 Q. Are you aware of any involvement of a 
3 gastroenterologist prior to the surgery that she went 
4 through on November 3? • 
5 A. Gastroenterologist had seen her and she 
6 had this — that's what I was referring to - the upper •  
7 and lower endoscopic examinations. Yes. 
8 Q. And does that in any way affect your opinion 
9 that Dr. Watts acted somehow inappropriately in trying to H 
10 secure consultations and evaluations for Ms. MacLeod? 
11 A. Yes. Because Dr. Watts was not her doctor; u 
12 Dr. Salisbury was. And you know, he — he didn't belong \i 
13 in the mix there. He's a nephew who's a radiologist. 
14 But he didn't belong in the mix as acting on her behalf > 
15 as a primary care physician. 
16 She had primary care physician who had been 
17 involved with her for a long time. 1 
18 Q. Is it your testimony that he was acting as the ; 
19 primary care physician for Ms. MacLeod shortly before the 
20 November 3 surgery by Dr. Kohler? 
21 A. He certainly was. At least - and even more so 
22 afterwards. In other words, he was making referrals to a 
23 surgeon and afterwards he was admitting her to the 
24 patient himself— to the hospital himself. 
25 Q. My question, sir, was limited to the November 3. 
7 (Pages 22 to 25) 
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1 For the ease of discussion, I wanted to stop at that 
2 point. 
3 Is your answer the same if we limit it to 
4 November 3? 
5 A. November 3 less than later when later involved. 
6 But he did interpose himself. The referral was not made 
7 by Dr. Salisbury, who would have been the appropriate one 
8 to make the referral. 
9 Q. Are you aware of the interaction that 
10 Ms. MacLeod and Dr. Watts had had in, say, the preceding 
11 ten or so years from time to time when Ms. MacLeod would 
12 inquire about Dr. Watts and enlist his help in getting 
13 studies and referrals? Things of that nature. 
14 MS.MAG1D: Objection. Calls into question 
15 facts not in evidence. 
16 Q. BY MR. DRAKE: If in fact there had been fairly 
17 frequent involvement between the two them over the course 
18 of the preceding years, would that change your mind as 
19 the propriety of Dr. Watts acting to facilitate securing 
20 care for her in late 1998? 
21 MS. MAG1D: I'm going to object to that being a 
22 hypothetical that doesn't give all of the facts that the 
23 doctor would need to answer that question. 
24 Q. BY MR. DRAKE: Go ahead. 
25 A. I think it's still inappropriate for a 
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1 radiologist of a relative to interpose himself m the 
2 care of a patient who is being cared for by a qualified 
3 physician. 
4 Q. What's your understanding of Dr. Salisbury's 
5 area of expertise? 
6 A. He's an internist. Internal medicine. 
7 Q. With a specialty in cardiology? 
8 A. Yes. ! 
9 Q. Is it your belief that Dr. Salisbury was unaware 
10 of the consultations that Ms. MacLeod was receiving in 
11 October/November,'98, that led up to the surgery? 
12 A. I'm sure he was unaware and certainly would not 
13 have recommended - according to his deposition, would 
14 not have recommended the surgery. 
15 Q. Is it your opinion that the surgery was not 
16 needed or was in some manner unnecessary? 
17 MR. F1SHLER: Objection, Foundation. 
IB THE WITNESS: It's my belief that the surgery 
19 was totally unnecessary. 
20 Q. BY MR. DRAKE: Why? 
21 A. Because she did not have an acute gallbladder 
•22 disease. She had symptoms of irritable bowel syndrome. 
23 And they're not cured by cholecystectomy. 
24 MR. FISHLER: I'm going to inteipose an 
25 objection to that last question. 
L 
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1 Foundation. 
2 Q. B Y MR. DRAKE: Is it your belief, Dr. Hance, 
3 that Dr. Watts played any active role in the actual 
4 decision of whether or not to undergo the surgery that 
5 Dr. Kohler performed? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. And you would concede, would you not, that he 
8 had absolutely nothing to do with that decision? 
9 A. He had nothing to do with that decision. He 
10 just facilitated the referral to Dr. Kohler, and 
11 Dr. Kohler made the decision to operate. 
12 Q. And you think that was below the standard of 
13 care? 
14 A. I think it was. 
15 Q. Have you ever been asked by a relative, 
16 Dr. Hance, to act as a facilitator - if I may use that 
17 word — to try to secure a consultation or a visit to 
18 another physician? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. How frequently have you been called upon by your 
i 21 relative to do that, sir? 
| 22 A. Fairly frequently, 
23 Q. How often? 
24 A. Couple times a year. 
25 Q. That's as often as it occurs? 
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1 A. Yeah. Y> 
2 Q. Tell me some of the kinds of things that you've 
3 done for relatives in terms of securing consultations or \\ 
4 visits, examinations. Things of that nature. 
5 A. It usually involves somebody who would call with • 
6 a medical problem and ask what kind of specialist to 
7 consult with that. And I'd ask them, you know, what is j 
8 your problem? • 
9 Well, if it's a hearing problem, you need to 
10 call an EMT doctor and they take care of hearing 
11 problems. If it's a sight problem, you need to call an p 
12 ophthalmologist. R 
13 It's that sort of generic advise that I give l 
14 them. K 
15 Go on and call an ophthalmologist or EMT doctor. ; 
16 If they're bleeding, call a gastroenterologist. 
17 Q. Have you ever secured a surgical consult for a 
18 relative? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. Never have? 
21 A. No. That's - you don't want to get involved on 
22 that end of it. Let the subspecialist or the primary 
23 care doctor pick the surgeon. Because I don't Ywz in 
24 the community where most of my relatives live in. 
25 Q. In what community is that, sir, that your 
8 (Pages 26 to 29) 
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1 November 3 -- any such patient who calls and asks for 
2 assistance warrants an immediate referral to the surgeon 
3 who performed the surgery? 
4 MS. MAGID: Objection. It mischaracterizes his 
5 testimony. 
6 MR. FISHLER: Objection. Foundation, misstated. 
7 Q. BY MR. DRAKE: And your answer, sir, is? 
8 A. Answer is yes. 
9 Q. So really, the clinical picture is what - one 
10 need not say unimportant. But it's just simply the fact 
11 that that surgery has taken place and you got a post-op 
12 complaint. 
13 That series of events alone you bel ieve warrants 
34 a referral to the surgeon. Correct? 
15 A. Absolutely. 
16 Q. Was there anything in your mind that was 
17 particularly worrisome or troublesome about Ms. MacLeod's 
18 condition on November 6 immediately prior to the time she 
19 was admitted to the hospital? 
20 A. Yes. That normally after you've had a 
21 laparoscopic cholecystectomy and you go home, you're -
22 with time you're getting better and your symptoms are 
23 going away. In other words, everybody has postoperative 
24 discomfort. But with the passage of time, it's getting 
25 better with each hour and each day. 
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1 And she's describing increasing problems. So 
2 something is not going according to the expected course 
3 of events. 
4 MR. FISHLER: Objection. Foundation. 
5 Misstated. 
6 Q. BY MR. DRAKE: Dr. Hance, what experience, sir, 
7 have you had in following patients in the immediate 
8 postoperative period following a laparoscopic 
9 cholecystectomy? 
10 A. We're asked to see these patients on a regular 
11 basis and perform various imaging studies, including CT 
12 on them, on a regular basis. And we talk to these 
13 patients and we know what to expect. 
14 Q. How frequently do you do that, sir, at the 
15 present time? 
16 A. Well, when I'm practicing in the hospital, we do 
17 it several times in a day. We got post-op patients that 
18 are having problems and we evaluate them with our imaging 
19 studies and we talk to the patients. 
20 Q. For the purpose of my question, I intended to 
21 limit it to patients who have undergone laparoscopic 
22 cholecystectomies. 
23 Are you able to address your experience with 
24 just that subset of patients? 
25 A. Probably couple times a week we're seeing 
, L 
( 
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1 patients who have had laparoscopic cholecystectomies and 
2 having some symptoms and some concerns. 
3 • Q. When you say "see" these patients - sent to the 
4 radiology department for a study? 
5 A. Correct 
6 Q. You're not following them on the floor or 
7 clinically? Anything of that nature? 
8 A. I'm not making surgical rounds on them. I see 
9 them in the X ray department when they come down for 
10 post-op chest or they come down for three-way abdomen, 
11 for ileus or pain and come down for a CT worrying about 
12 perforation or bowel leak. 
13 So we're evaluating them in that sort of 
14 situation. We're not surgeons making rounds on the ward. 
15 Right 
16 Q. Would you defer to a surgeon, sir, as to what 
17 the expected postoperative course ought to be in a 
18 post-laparoscopic cholecystectomy patient? 
19 A. I would defer to a patient But I know for a 
20 fact that the normal postoperative course is that of 
21 improvement. And when you deviate from that and you get 
22 a patient who is getting worse, that's the time the 
23 surgeon has to get involved. 
24 Q. Sir, do you intend to render any opinions in 
25 this case as to when - how the perforation in the bowel 
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1 occurred first of all? 
2 A. I think how it occurred, I don't know. When it 
3 occurred, \t occurred at the time of surgery. 
4 MR. FISHLER: Objection-
5 Q. BY MR. DRAKE: You intend to render such an 
6 opinion at trial? 
7 A. Absolutely. That's when perforations in the 
8 small bowel occur in laparoscopic procedures, is when you 
9 introduce the instrument through abdominal wall. 
10 MR. FISHLER: Objection. Foundation. 
11 He's not a general surgeon. 
12 Q. BY MR. DRAKE: In any of the rather extensive 
13 number of medical/legal cases in which you've been 
14 involved historically, have you ever been qualified to 
15 give an opinion on general surgery issues in the court of 
16 law? 
17 A. I'm not a general surgeon and I'm not qualified. 
18 I do know that the time of the perforation in 
19 laparoscopic cholecystectomy — and you'll read this in 
20 the literature. Every doctor reads this in the 
21 literature - is at the time of the introduction of the 
22 instrument That's the dangerous time. 
23 MR. FISHLER: Objection. Foundation. 
24 Q. BY MR. DRAKE: My question to you, sir, have you 
25 ever been qualified to render such an opinion in court? 
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1 I take it your answer is no? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. Do you intend to render any opinions in this 
4 case as to what the appropriate care or treatment should 
5 have been if a general surgeon had been consulted on or 
6 about November 6 when Ms. MacLeod was readmitted to the 
7 hospital? 
8 A. She would have been taken back to surgery and 
9 the perforation closed. 
10 MR.FISHLER: Objection. Foundation. 
11 Q. B Y MR. DRAKE: Would you defer to a general 
12 surgeon, sir, as to the timing of that decision in this 
13 case? 
14 A. As to the timing, yes. 
15 Q. What is your understanding, Dr. Hance, of--
16 well, strike that. 
17 You testified earlier, sir, that at the point 
18 when Dr. Watts admits her on November 6 that he didn't do 
19 an adequate history.. 
20 Did I understand your testimony correctly -
21 A. History and physical. Yes, sir. 
22 Q. Is it your belief, sir, that that supposed 
23 failure had anything to do with her future course and her 
24 outcome in this case? 
25 A. I don't know. 
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1 Q. So as I understand your testimony, sir, at the 
2 time that Ms. MacLeod contacts with Dr. Watts on November 
3 6, you believe that he should have contacted Dr. Kohler 
4 or Dr. Fullmer to report that Ms. MacLeod was supposedly 
5 having problems. 
6 Correct? 
7 A. Correct. 
8 Q. Anything else that he should have done at that 
9 time? 
10 A. That's what he should have done at that time and 
11 leave it in the hands of the surgeon. 
12 Q. And how the course of events would have gone 
13 from there in terms of timing and other treatment you're 
14 going to leave to others to say. 
15 Correct? 
\6 A. Correct. 
17 Q. What is your understanding of how Ms. MacLeod 
18 did in terms of her clinical course on November 7? 
19 A. According to doctor notes, she appeared to be 
20 improving on the antibiotics that he'd put her on. 
i 21 Q. When was she first placed on antibiotics? 
22 A. I'd have to look that up. 1 don't remember. 
23 But somewhere in that thing Dr. Watts placed her on 
24 antibiotics and she appeared to him to be improving. 
25 Q. Would you agree, Dr. Hance, based upon what was 
. L 
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1 ultimately found at the second surgery that Dr. Kohler 
2 performed that at some point Ms. MacLeod was going to 
3 need another surgery to address this perforation of the 
4 bowel? 
5 A, Absolutely. The sooner the better. 
6 Q. Did you intend to render any opinions at trial, 
7 sir, with respect to any supposed delay in the performing 
8 of that second surgery? 
9 A. Only that the delay in making the diagnosis of 
10 the perforation and undertaking the second surgery 
11 resulted in this large abscess that she had. 
12 MR. FISHLER: Objection. Foundation as stated. 
13 Q. BY MR. DRAKE: Again, do you intend to render 
14 any opinions at trial that any aspect of the — either 
15 the hospitalization that she underwent after the second 
16 surgery or anything at all was proximately caused by the 
17 supposed delay in doing the second surgery? 
18 A. I'm not sure 1 understand your question, sir. 
19 Q, I don't know how else to do it, sir. 
20 Do you intend to testify that the supposed delay 
21 in doing the second surgery caused any of her problems 
22 between the time of that surgery and the present? 
23 A. It caused the large abscess to form. In other 
24 words, nonnally if you have a perforated small bowel and 
25 it's promptly recognized and promptly operated on, you do 
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1 not expect a large abscess to form, which she did have 
2 when she went to surgery several days later. 
3 Q. Just so that I'm clear, doctor, do you intend to : 
4 render any opinions with respect to Ms. MacLeod's current • 
5 condition and whether or not any of the current problems • 
6 she claims to suffer from were caused by this delay in ;; 
7 doing the second surgery? 
8 A. I'm not aware of her current problems. My 
9 involvement ends with her 24 of November, '98. h 
10 Q. Okay. Did you read through her medical records 
11 to detennine what involvement Dr. Watts had with her 
12 between the time of the second surgery and when she was ?; 
13 discharged? : 
14 A. I read those records and I know he was, you 
15 know, interested in her course and visited her. 
16 But that's about all. 
17 Q. What is your understanding of these 
18 circumstances surrounding Dr. Corniea's being brought in 
19 to consult on the case? 
20 A. He was brought in as a consultant for some of 
21 the problems she was having. And she had bilateral 
22 plural effusions and she had had the central line placed, 
23 developed a pneumothorax, but denied the need to - or 
24 refused to have them put a chest tube in. And it 
25 resolved without it. 
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CLARK NEWHALL (#7091) 
320 West 200 South, Suite 100B 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3757 
Mall To: P.O. Box 284 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0284 
(801) 363-8888 
Fax (801) 596-8888 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LUCYMacLEOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY WATTS MDetal, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DARWOOD HANCE 
Civil No. 010400391 
Judge Steven Hansen 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
:ss 
County of ) 
Darwood Hance MD, Affiant, being first duly sworn and under oath, deposes and 
says: 
1) I am a physician licensed in California. 
2) I am board certified in Radiology and am a practicing radiologist. 
3) I am a designated expert witness in the above-entitled case. 
4) I have reviewed the medical records of Lucy Johnson nee MacLeod for the hospital 
admissions of November 3,1998 and November 6, 1998, 
5) I have reviewed the depositions of Gary Watts MD, Steven Salisbury MD and 
Douglas Kohler MD taken in the above-entitled case. 
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6) I hold the opinion that Dr. Watts breached the applicable standard of care in rendering 
medical care to the plaintiff in this case. 
7) I hold the opinion that one or more of Dr. Watts' breaches of the standard of care 
caused damage to plaintiff. 
a) Specifically, the following facts support my opinions: 
b) Dr. Watts referred plaintiff to the surgeon, Dr. Kohler, 
c) Dr. Watts breached the standard of care when he failed to consult plaintiffs 
primary care physician, Dr. Salisbury, before referring plaintiff to Dr. Kohler. 
d) Dr. Salisbury stated that plaintiff had had symptoms of irritable bowel syndrome 
for many years 
e) Dr. Salisbury noted that the physicians at Utah Valley Hospital did not request 
information from him about plaintiffs prior history of abdominal symptoms or 
prior examinations. 
f) Dr. Salisbury stated that plaintiffs "irritable bowel syndrome was misinterpreted 
as gallbladder disease" by physicians at Utah Valley Hospital. 
g) If Dr. Watts had the information available from Dr. Salisbury, in my opinion there 
would have been no medical reason to refer plaintiff to Dr. Kohler or any other 
surgeon. 
h) The referral to Dr. Kohler led to the surgery performed by Kohler in which 
plaintiff was injured. 
i) Plaintiffs injury, a perforated intestine with intra-abdominal and abdominal wall 
infection, occurred most likely at the time of her surgery on November 3,1998. 
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j) Plaintiffs intra-abdominal infection continued and worsened following 
November 5,1998, when she first complained of abdominal pain to Dr. Watts. 
k) When plaintiff informed him of her continuing abdominal pain on November 6, 
1998, Dr. Watts breached the standard of care by failing to consult either Dr. 
Kohler or the surgeon on call for Dr. Kohlcr. 
1) Because Dr, Watts failed to consult a surgeon in a timely fashion on and after 
November 6, 1998, plaintiff suffered pain and increasing infection for at least two 
and one-half days without appropriate treatment. 
m) Because Dr. Watts failed to obtain surgical consultation on November 6,1998, 
plaintiff more likely than not suffered additional complications and additional 
hospitalization. 
n) In addition to the pain and suffering associated with the two and one-half days 
that plaintiff went without appropriate treatment, plaintiff more likely than not 
incurred additional hospital bills. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before mc this ? m day of 
&%$m 20 eg . 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
/ ( 
EXHIBIT C 
f ! O l O f 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 23 
1 and every one? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And it's important to do that in order to know 
4 what you're going to do at the time of surgery? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. In planning a laparoscopic cholecystectomy, 
7 would knowledge of previous abdominal surgeries be 
8 important? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q . I want to take you to the records of Dr. Danny 
11 Young Hawkins. This is an obstetrician, I'll tell you, 
12 who treated Mrs. MacLeod, and I'm going to refer you to 
13 a note that I believe is dated 10-23-98, so it would be 
14 not too long before the surgeries at issue, and I'm 
15 going to read you a portion of the deposition that 
16 refers to that note because you have not yet — 
17 MR. F1SHLER: Can 1 see that note? 
18 MR.NEWHALL: Yes, you can. 
19 Q. You have not yet had the opportunity to look at 
20 that deposition, but I'm going to read you from pages 59 
21 to 60 of the deposition that refers to that note: 
22 "QUESTION: Okay. Now, let's look at this drawing 
23 that you've put here on this page. 
24 ANSWER: Uh-huh. 
25 QUESTION: Can you just illustrate for us what it 
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1 means, what it is you're seeing, the bottom line, the 
2 horizontal line that he's representing the 
3 Pfannenstiel's incision? 
4 ANSWER: The little loop at the top is her belly 
5 button, and then the lines on the side are showing the 
6 separation of the abdominal wall muscle. The "X" is on 
7 the Pfannenstiel's incision where I thought there might 
8 have been a defect in that scar. 
9 QUESTION: And then the heavy vertical line? 
10 ANSWER: That is showing the midline of the abdomen, 
11 and I think it might be an incision. I don't recall if 
12 she had one there or not. 
13 QUESTION: Let's go over and look at your notes just 
14 adjacent there. 
15 ANSWER: To the right? 
16 QUESTION: Yos. 
17 ANSWER: Okay. 
18 QUESTION: Do you record a vertical incision? 
19 ANSWER: No, 1 don't there. 
20 QUESTION: Do you know whether she had an abdominal 
21 wall vertical incision? 
22 ANSWER: I think she did because she had a bowel 
23 obstruction in 76. 
24 QUESTION: Right. And how far up from the - 1 
25 guess I should say at what point along the umbilicus did 
( N 
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1 the abdominal wall vertical incision begin? 
2 ANSWER: Oh, my drawings aren't precise enough to 
3 tell you that. 
4 QUESTION: Okay. I'll represent to you, since you 
5 weren't aware of this, that Mrs. MacLeod had had a 
6 hysterectomy through a Pfannenstiel's incision and then 
7 following that had had at least one episode of small 
8 bowel obstruction due to adhesions, and at the time of 
9 at least one of these episodes she had had a midline -
10 lower midline incision for release of the bowel 
11 obstruction." 
12 Okay? 
13 A. Okay. 
14 Q. And we'll just take that as a given while we're 
15 talking about this whether you know about that or not 
16 from previous records. 
17 A. Okay. 
18 Q. Okay. Given that fact that I just told you, is 
19 it likely that Mrs. MacLeod, at the time of Dr. Kohler's 
20 surgery, had abdominal adhesions? 
21 MR.FISHLER: Objection. Foundation. Answer if you 
22 can. 
23 THE WITNESS: I think it's very possible-.. 
24 BY MR. NEWHALL: 
25 Q. Would it, say, be more likely than not? 
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1 MR.FISHLER: Same objection. 
2 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
3 BY MR. NEWHALL: 
4 Q. Okay. And would it be likely that the 
5 adhesions, if they were present adherent to the 
6 underside of the - or to the anterior right abdominal 
7 wall at the point of the previous lower midline 
8 incision? 
9 MR.FISHLER: Objection. Foundation. 
10 THE WITNESS: That would be the likely spot. 
11 BY MR. NEWHALL: 
12 Q. Okay. Did you make a deduction as to when the 
13 injury occurred - well, let me take it back. Did you 
14 make a deduction as to when the bowel perforation that 
15 was eventually discovered by Dr. Kohler occurred? 
16 A . I think there are possibilities, a couple of 
17 possibilities. One possibility would be upon entry into 
1S the abdominal wall and — 
19 Q. You mean entry with a trocar? 
20 A. Yes. And the other possibility would be when 
21 instruments are being reintroduced in and out of the 
22 trocars, you know, I suppose it's always possible to 
23 poke something then. I can't say that lVc ever seen 
24 that happen, but we are always taught to look and make 
25 sure wc don't poke something as wc slide, you know, the 
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1 instruments, the forceps and things in and out of the 
2 trocars. But those would be the two opportunities that 
3 you would think that it would - could likely occur. 
4 Q. And, of those two, which is the most likely? 
5 A. Based on the fact that I have heard of injuries 
6 when the trocar is first inserted, that I have not 
7 actually seen one caused by instruments inserted later, 
8 1 would have to say the most common is when the trocar 
9 is first inserted. 
10 Q. Okay. Are you aware of any statistics related 
11 to bowel injuries and trocar insertion? 
12 A. I'm not aware of specific statistics. 
13 Q. Okay. I take it, though, that you review the 
14 medical literature, the surgical literature fairly 
15 regularly? 
16 A. Yes, I do. 
17 Q. Okay. What journals do you particularly 
18 review? 
19 A. The ones that I read most commonly would be 
20 Critical Care Medicine, Journal of Trauma would probably 
21 be the big ones but also Surgeons of Surgery and what 
22 used to be SG&O and now is the Journal of the American 
23 College of Surgeons. Those are the journals that I 
24 take. 
25 Q. Okay. And are there any particular textbooks 
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1 that you use in your practice or recommend to your 
2 residents as textbooks for surgery practice? 
3 A. Textbooks for surgery, again, I use several. I 
4 have a Sabasiton, I have a Schwartz, and 1 have a 
5 Cameron. I also have a copy of one put out that our own 
6 surgeon is one of the editors of. It's called "The 
7 Scientific Basis of Surgical Practice," 1 have those. 
8 I haven't read it as much. 
9 Q. Naughty, naughty. 
10 MR.FISHLER: Get on that. 
11 BYMR.NEWHALL: 
12 Q. And do you have any books that you use that 
13 reference laparoscopic surgery? 
14 A. I'm trying to think what's on my shelf. I 
15 don't have one that I've used, that I've used 
16 regularly. I may have a small - meaning a throw-away 
17 type — laparoscopic surgical text or one that was given 
18 to me. 1 have not bought a major laparoscopic text 
19 Q. Do you, yourself, perform or supervise, rather 
20 than performing, some laparoscopic surgery? 
21 A. Lots of types - 1 should say some types of 
22 laparoscopic surgery, yes; other types, no. 1 do lots 
23 of laparoscopic cholecystectomies. That's kind of the 
24 modem standard. Do some — in the past I've done 
25 laparoscopic inguinal hernia repairs, don't tend to do 
1 those much anymore because it's not clear to me that 
2 it's an advantage to do it that way. I've done some 
3 laparoscopic ventrical hernia repairs which can 
4 sometimes be done better that way. I've done 
5 laparoscopic nissen fundoplications. That's another 
6 procedure that lends itself, 1 think, to laparoscopic 
7 approaches. 
8 And then, finally, we use laparoscopy once m awhile 
9 for - for trauma, mostly to see if the peritoneal 
10 cavity has been violated, a stab wound. And our 
11 approach there is if we see a hole on the Inside, of the 
12 peritoneum, we usually open them up and explore'them 
13 more formally, but if we don't find a hole under the 
14 abdomen, we stop and say it was a flesh wound. 
15 Q. In other words, if you don't find that parietal 
16 peritoneum breach, you consider that it's not — 
17 A. Yeah. 
18 Q. — needing open laparoscopic surgery? Okay. 
19 A. We'll use them for other odd reasons. I've 
20 used them for laparoscopy, for the placement of 
21 jejiinostomy feeding tubes for liver biopsy. My point is 
22 I don't do laparoscopic adrenalectomy, laparoscopic 
23 colon resection and that sort of thing. 
24 Q. I understand. And, I take it, you've done 
25 laparoscopic surgery since 1998 at least? 
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1 A. Yes. Probably since 1992. 
2 Q. Would you like to get that phone? We'll take a 
3 break. 
4 (Whereupon a discussion was held off the record.) 
5 BYMR.NEWHALL: 
6 Q. All right. I was on track and got off track a 
7 little bit, 1 think. I think we've established that the 
8 likeliest cause of the perforation or the bowel injury, 
9 in your view, is the trocar insertion? 
10 A. Probably the entry into the abdomen, 
11 Q. Okay. 
12 A. The one tiling that I think is pertinent to note 
13 is that he did do this by what's referred to as the open 
14 technique which is appropriate. In other words, many 
15 times when we do laparoscopic surgeiy we grab the 
16 abdominal wall with clamps penetrating, towel clips lift 
17 it up and poke a needle called a varus needle through, 
18 fill the abdomen with C02. That's done blindly. It is 
19 appropriate in someone who's had previous surgeiy to 
20 make an incision and to go in and direct visualization, 
21 which is what he did, at least as I can interpret the 
22 operative report. 
23 Q. Yeah. That's veiy interesting to me because it 
24 seems like I have a different impression myself. Can I 
25 ask you to refer to the operative report that you have 
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1 likely that the infection would get worse in the two and 
2 a half days without antibiotics — 
3 MR. DRAKE: Objection. 
4 MR.NEWHALL: - and treatment? 
5 MR. DRAKE: Sony. Same objections. 
6 MR. NEWHALL: Thank you. 
7 THE WITNESS: If it were untreated, presumably, it 
8 would get worse. 
9 MR. NEWHALL: Thank you. 
10 Q. If Dr. Kohler had examined Mrs. MacLeod on the 
11 5th and had determined that she had an intra-abdominal 
12 infection, what would have been the appropriate course 
13 at that time? 
14 Well, let me take it even farther than that. If he 
15 had examined her on the 5th and determined that she had 
16 a perforated viscus, what would be the appropriate 
17 course at that time? 
18 A. To operate on it and fix i t 
19 Q. A n d -
20 A. And fix it meaning either repair it, resect it, 
21 do an ostomy. There are lots of options, depends on 
22 what you thought but -
23 Q. I understand. 
24 A. - treat it surgically. 
25 Q. 1 know in hindsight - sorry. We know in 
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1 hindsight that Mrs. MacLeod did have a perforated viscus 
2 on November 5th more likely than not, do we not? Do you 
3 agree with that? 
4 A. I think the evidence suggests that. 
5 Q. Okay. And knowing that in hindsight, would you 
6 agree that the period of time, November 5th to the point 
7 which she actually did have an operation, November 9th, 
8 probably resulted in an increase in the severity of the 
9 infection that she did have? 
10 MR. DRAKE: Objection. Assumes facts not in 
11 evidence. Calls for speculation. 
12 THE WITNESS: It may have resulted in an increase 
13 from — in the severity, 
14 BY MR. NEWHALL: 
15 Q. Well, let's try that once again then. I'm 
16 asking you for a probability. Would you agree that it 
17 more likely than not did result in an increase in the 
18 infection severity? 
19 MR. DRAKE: Same objections. 
20 THE WITNESS: Again, I have to say I can't know 
21 that. I would say based on what we usually sec, yes, 
22 this probably would have gotten worse; on the other 
23 hand, as I'm sure you're aware, there's literature of 
24 perforated ulcers, for instance, being managed 
25 nonopcratively altogether. 
L 
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1 BY MR. NEWHALL: 
2 Q. You've earlier indicated that the procedure 
3 that one should undertake when presented with a 
4 perforated viscus of this type is to operate; is that 
5 right? 
6 A. That's what I would do. 
7 Q. So a nonoperative course, such as is used in 
8 perforated ulcers, is not an alternative in this case; 
9 is that right? 
10 A. It wouldn't have been my choice. Now, a 
11 nonoperative course in perforated ulcers is not done 
12 here either, but it's done in the United Kingdom. 
13 Q. But in this particular instance a nonoperative 
14 treatment is not a course of action that you believe is 
15 within the standard of care? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. Okay, Now, if Dr. Kohler, as we know it, was 
18 not available in the period sometime after 
19 Lucy MacLeod's surgery and until November 9th, you agree 
20 with that, he was out of town? 
21 A. That's what it seems to be suggesting. 
22 Q. If that is the case, should he have had another 
23 surgeon on call to handle problems on his patients, 
24 recently operated patients, I should say? 
25 A. That would normally be the case. I will say 
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1 that in a patient who has gone home, that may not be the 
2 case. In other words, when I go out of town, if I'm 
3 leaving a patient in the hospital, I absolutely find out 
4 who is going to -- you know, who is going to cover for 
5 me and who is going to see that patient while that 
6 patient is in the hospital. Do we have something worked 
7 out like if I have patients at home, well, yeah, we 
8 always have somebody in our practice on call, but I may 
9 not specifically — if I don't have patients in the 
10 hospital, I may not specifically find someone to cover 
11 for me. It would be one of my partners. There's always 
12 someone on call that would handle that. 
13 Q. Would you agree that if Dr. Kohler did hear 
14 from Dr. Watts, as we've described on November 5th, that 
15 he should have asked Dr. Watts to - no matter what the 
16 concern was with Lucy MacLeod, simply that she had 
17 abdominal pain on November 5th, would you agree that 
18 Dr. Kohler should have said to Dr. Watts that 
19 Dr. Fullmer was on call and could take care of Lucy if 
20 something arose? 
21 A. Ifthat was the case, if Dr. Fullmer was indeed 
22 on call. 
23 Q, He was, I'll tell you that. 
24 A. Then, yeah, that would be appropriate. 
25 Q. A n d -
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1 A, Oh, 40, line eight I'm sorry. "Did you 
2 consult any other physicians at that time? No, I did 
3 not" 
4 Q. Okay. So docs that suggest that Dr. Fullmer 
5 was not consulted about Mrs. MacLeod? 
6 MR. F1SHLER: Objection. Speculation, 
7 THE WITNESS: It suggests that he says - that he 
8 says I made an attempt to reach Dr. Fullmer but it kind 
9 of sounds like he didn't but -
10 BY MR. NEWHALL: 
11 Q. And earlier you said that one of the 
12 considerations in - if you were to have heard about 
13 Lucy MacLeod on November 5th, one of the considerations 
14 would be if she got worse, if she got worse from 
15 November 5th on, what would be the appropriate course 
16 for a surgeon, prudent surgeon? 
17 A. To bring her back to the hospital and to begin 
18 to sort things out. 
19 Q. And would a prudent surgeon want to have the 
20 radiologist perform that function soley -
21 MR.FISHLER: Objection. 
22 MR. NEWHALL: - and not be involved himself? 
23 MR. FISHLER: Vague and ambiguous. 
24 THE WITNESS: In general, no. 
25 BY MR. NEWHALL: 
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1 Q. Why not? 
2 A. Well, I guess radiologists are radiologists and 
3 surgeons are surgeons. 
4 Q. A n d -
5 A. Meaning specifically that a radiologist would 
6 not normally be who you would choose to examine your 
7 patients. 
8 Q. Why not? 
9 A. Well, because they are trained in radiology but 
10 they're not trained in surgery. 
11 Q. And if Lucy MacLeod worsened after the 5th of 
12 November and you brought her back to the hospital, what 
13 sorts of things would you do at that time? 
14 A. I would examine her. 
15 MR. DRAKE: Objection. Vague. 
16 THE WITNESS: Find out what had been going on, in 
17 other words, take a history exam of her. I would check 
18 the white count, look at her vital signs. That's where 
19 I would start. 
20 BY MR. NEWHALL: 
21 Q. And by "examination," what sorts of things 
22 would you do? 
23 A. I'd listen to her heart and lungs. I'd check 
24 her pulse. I'd look at her blood pressure. I would 
25 examine her abdomen, obviously, listen for bowel sounds, 
/ 
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1 palpate it, visually inspect it. 
2 Q. Would you describe your examination in writing 
3 if you did those things? 
4 A. I would. It would probably be brief, but it 
5 would be things like abdomen is distended and tender or 
6 abdomen is absolutely soft and non tender, in those 
7 terms. It wouldn't be a lengthy description but it 
8 would be somewhat. 
9 Q. Would some of your description also comprise 
10 the history in your written description? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Would some of your description comprise the 
13 visual inspection portion of your examination? 
14 A. Yes, it would. 
15 Q. Would some of your description be comprised of 
16 the bowel sounds portion of your examination? 
17 A. Usually would be bowel sounds positive or 
18 negative. It would be simple but it would probably be 
19 there. 
20 Q. Would some of your description be comprised of 
21 the heart and lung examination that you performed? 
22 A. Usually would. 
23 Q. Would it be below the standard of care for a 
24 surgeon to fail to document an examination such as 
25 you've described -
Page 90 
1 MR. DRAKE: Objection. Vague. 
2 MR. NEWHALL: - in a situation like this? 
3 MR. DRAKE: Same objection. j 
4 THE WITNESS: Well, when you say "below the standard •; 
5 of care," I mean because of the very things that we are 
6 dealing with now, it would obviously help if those 
7 things were better documented. Does everybody always do u 
8 mat? No. ' pi 
9 BY MR. NEWHALL: : 
10 Q. Wei 1, I'm just asking about the standard. 
11 A. I'm sure there are times when attending 
12 physicians write an interpretation, I think this patient 
13 has blank and this is what I'm going to do about it, and h 
34 may not write anything more detailed than that. For 
3 5 obvious reasons, that's - for the problems that we're k 
16 having now, that's sometimes tough to deal with. It's 
17 tough to go back and look two years later and find out 
18 what did you really do and what did you really think. 
19 Q. Well, it's actually a pretty simple question. 
20 You as a surgeon and an expert are supposed to be able 
21 to comment on the standard of care applicable to the 
22 surgeon, so I just want to know if a surgeon fails to 
23 document a physical examination in a situation such as 
24 this, is that below the standard of care? 
25 MR. DRAKE: Objection. Vague. 
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1 THE WITNESS: 1 suppose that the standard of care 
2 would involve adequate documentation, 
3 BY MR. NEWHALL: 
4 Q. Okay. Would that also be true of a physician 
5 ofany type? 
6 MR. DRAKE: Objection. Lacks foundation, vague. 
7 THE WITNESS: Yes, I suppose so. 
8 BY MR. NEWHALL: 
9 Q. If an earlier diagnosis of intra-abdominal 
10 viscus perforation - that's an ontology - of 
11 perforated viscus had been made on Lucy MacLeod earlier 
12 than November 9, you've indicated that surgery is the 
13 only choice in such a situation, I believe; is that 
14 corcect? 
15 A. I think so. 
16 Q. If an earlier diagnosis had been made, would 
17 surgery done at the time of that earlier diagnosis 
18 likely have made a difference in her hospital course? 
19 MR. DRAKE: Objection. Vague. 
20 MR. NEWHALL: And, yes, again this is one of those 
21 likely/not likely type questions, no certain answer can 
22 be ascertained, I'm sure. 
23 THE WITNESS: It's very difficult to say. I would 
24 say the longer you wait, probably the worse the chance 
25 of complications in general. 
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1 BY MR. NEWHALL: 
2 Q. Okay. 
3 A. Would it have been different, I don't know. 
4 Q. No, 1 don't ask you to know. I'm just asking 
5 for a probability one way or the other, if you can say. 
6 MR. DRAKE: Same objections. 
7 MR. F1SHLER: If you can, give him only probability. 
8 MR. NEWHALL: Yes. 
9 THE WITNESS: As I said, the longer you wait, I 
10 think potentially the worse the complications in 
11 general. 
12 BY MR. NEWHALL: 
13 Q. Okay. Do you agree that in someone who has 
14 intra-abdominal surgery and bowel obstruction from 
15 adhesions that the more subsequent abdominal surgeries 
16 they have, the more likely they are to develop bowel 
17 obstruction later? 
18 MR. DRAKE: Objection. Vague, speculation. 
19 THE WITNESS: I think that is true. 
20 BY MR. NEWHALL: 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A. Adhesions tend to beget adhesions so-to-speak, 
23 so the more you have, the more you're going to'get. 
24 Q, Do you agree that in the absence of obstruction 
25 of a gallbladder, a gallbladder now, that a gallbladder 
( 
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1 is unlikely to become inflammed? 
2 A. No, I don't think that's generally true. 1 
3 think one can get acalculous cholecystitis in the 
4 absence of an obstructive stone. 
5 Q, Well, the question was a likely and unlikely. 
6 In the absence of an obstructing stone, is the 
7 gallbladder likely to become inflammed? 
8 A. It depends upon the clinical scenario. For a 
9 outpatient, less likely; for somebody who's a patient in 
10 the ICU, for example, and has been hypotensive, it's 
11 actually quite likely. 
12 Q. Yes, I'm just referring to the, you know, 
13 normal person walking down the street pretty much. 
14 A. Acalculous cholecystitis is in the absence of a 
15 stone or, again, cholecystitis in the absence of a stone 
16 is less likely than in other circumstances. 
17 Q. In fact, it's very unlikely, is it not? 
18 MR. FISHLER: Objection. Vague and ambiguous. 
19 THE WITNESS: Relatively unlikely. 
20 BY MR. NEWHALL: 
21 Q. And in the absence of cardiac disease and 
22 diabetes, it's nearly unheard of, is it not, in a person 
23 walking around on the street? 
24 A. In an otherwise healthy person, that's probably 
25 true. As we've kind of said all along, it sort of 
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1 repeatedly mentions the chronic acalculous | 
2 cholecystitis. As I've said, that's not a specific y 
3 diagnosis. It just may be that the physician says that 
4 kind of in reference to chronic gallbladder problems or 
5 pain could well have those problems without specifically • 
6 having them be chronic acalculous cholecystitis. -
7 Q. Does the presence of a midline abdominal scar 
8 and previous small bowel obstruction increase the 
9 incidence of perforated bowel with laparoscopic . 
10 cholecystectomy? [j 
11 A. I would say yes, it probably does. I can't fe 
12 quote you the numbers. 
13 Q. 1 n the event that a patient has 1 ower midl ine 
14 incision and previous abdominal surgery and small bowel ; 
15 obstruction in their past history, I think you've \ 
16 testified that an open procedure with hemostats on the ; 
17 sides of the fascia to look in the abdomen was your 
18 procedure of choice; is that right? 
19 A. Hassan type open procedure, yes. 
20 Q. Yeah. If one does that procedure but omits the 
21 step in which the hemostats are applied to the fascia 
22 and the fascia's elevated, is that a — is that 
23 something that you would do in your practice? 
24 A. I would want to elevate the fascia in some way, 
25 whether grabbing it by hemostats or putting in a heavy 
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1 lower right-hand corner and page 11 is the 
2 beginning of progress notes and the first section 
3 arc the physicians orders. Let me just ask you 
4 generally first, do you recall how it was that you 
5 became involved in Mrs. MacLeod's care? 
6 A. Yes. I was called that day. The 
7 surgeons involved were concerned about her sugars 
8 mostly and I was called for that and when I came to 
9 see her there were other problems I had to take 
10 care of as well. 
11 Q. And which surgeons contacted you with 
12 respect to consulting on her care? 
13 A. I don't remember who the surgeon was. I 
14 remember Dr. Fullmer helping take care of her but 
15 other than that, 1 don't remember exactly but I 
16 think it was - let me refer to - 1 mentioned in 
17 my admission note the patient was admitted by 
18 Dr. Kohler. 
19 Q. You're referring to a typewritten note 
20 in the exhibit on pages 18 and 19? 
21 A. Let me see. Yeah. 
22 Q. Okay. So as to whether it was 
23 Dr. Kohler or Dr. Fullmer that asked you to 
24 consult, you don't recall. 
25 A. 1 don't recall. 
Page 7 
1 Q. And it's your recollection, if I'm 
2 understanding you correct, that the purpose for 
3 your initial consultation was with respect to 
4 Mrs. MacLeod's blood sugars. 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Was it your understanding that her blood 
7 sugars were elevated or low? 
8 A. They were having troubles controlling 
9 her sugars, at first high and then low. 
10 Q. And at the time you were first consulted 
11 would that have been on November 13, 1998? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. And at that time were Mrs. MacLeod's 
14 blood sugars too high or too low? 
15 A. Too low. 
16 Q. Okay. Do you recall meeting with Lucy 
17 MacLeod and performing a history and physical 
18 examination? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Okay. As you sit here today do you 
21 recall the patient? Can you visualize what she 
; 22 looked like? 
23 A. 1 can't visualize her face or what she 
24 looked like. I remember she was elderly. Other 
25 than that, 1 can't remember too much more. I 
Page S 
1 remember more of the medical details than - or 
2 some of the medical details. 
3 Q. Looking at your typewritten note of 
4 November 13th, which is pages 18 and 19 of the 
5 exhibit- you're welcome to look on whichever copy 
6 you want. You have duplicates in front of you and 
7 that's fine. With respect to the history of 
8 present illness, where did you obtain that 
9 information? Was that from the patient, from 
10 Dr. Kohler, Dr. Fullmer, from the chart or some 
11 other source? 
12 A. Mostly it was obtained from the patient 
13 and from the notes. Dr. Kohler, Dr. Fullmer were 
14 not there at the time of my seeing her. 
15 Q. Okay. And as to Mrs. MacLeod's care 
16 prior to your involvement on November 13th of 1998, 
17 I take it any information you have about that care 
18 would have been through the records or through 
19 conversations with the patient or her surgeons and 
20 not from any direct involvement. 
21 A. Prior to that, no. 
22 Q. Okay. Were any portions of your 
23 physical examination significant with respect to 
24 the purpose for which you were asked to consult on 
25 this patient? 
Page 9 
1 A. I'm not sure 1 understand that question. 
2 You're saying was the physical exam significant 
3 regarding her sugars? 
4 Q. Correct 
5 A. There wasn't - there's nothing much on 
6 exam you see when someone's been sugar resuscitated h 
7 so - ; 
8 Q. From an internal medicine standpoint, 
9 were there any findings in your physical 
10 examination that were of concern to you? 
11 A. On physical examination? 
12 Q? Correct 1) 
13 A. She had a murmur and swelling in her 
14 legs as well as in her sacral area. 
15 Q. And why would that information be 
16 significant to you? 
17 A. Because of the patient's abdominal 
18 problems and inability to take food. She was on IV • 
19 fluids with D5 for nutrition and because of the 
20 fluids, her fluid status had become elevated so 
21 that she was beginning to retain fluid and that's 
22 one of the other things I addressed in my consult. 
23 Q. Okay. To your knowledge, for what 
24 period of time had Mrs. MacLeod been NPO prior to 
25 your seeing her on the 13th of November? 
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1 A. She had only been in the hospital, again 
2 just referring to notes, it appears three days or 
3 so but she had been discharged from the hospital 
4 previously and wasn't eating much at home either 
5 and so I think in my dictated text I say here she's 
6 been NPO for almost a week. 
7 Q. Okay. And you indicated that at the 
8 time you first consulted, her blood sugars were on 
9 the low side. 
10 A. Uh-huh. 
11 Q. Okay. And do you have any information 
12 as to why her blood sugars were low at the time of 
13 your first visit? 
14 A, Her blood sugars were low because of the 
15 insulin they were using. Its scale was a little 
16 too high and it caused her sugars to go low. 
17 Q. Do you know why she was on insulin? 
18 A. She was on insulin because of the high 
19 sugar she was having. 
20 Q. Okay. Was Mrs. MacLeod on TPN at the 
21 time of your first consultation? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Did you have any involvement in 
24 adjusting the insulin that she was getting? 
25 A. I did. 
Page J1 
1 Q. And I take it that you adjusted the 
2 insulin at die time of your first consultation in 
3 order to try to bring her blood sugars back to a 
4 normal range. 
5 A. Idid. 
6 Q. Do you know if other than some transient 
7 low blood sugars whether Mrs. MacLeod suffered any 
8 permanent effects from whatever low blood sugar she 
9 might have had prior to your consultation? 
10 A. Again I don't have all the orders here 
11 but I believe she was sugar resuscitated, so it 
12 wasn't for a long period of time she was 
13 hyperglycemic. And so having never met her before, 
14 J don't remember she was - as the hospital course 
] 5 went on she was able to speak to me. She wasn't 
16 delirious. She was able to tell me what was going 
17 on, as I recall. 
18 Q. When you first met with her on the 13th 
19 of November, do you recall what her level of 
20 consciousness was, whether she was alert and able 
21 to provide a history to you? 
22 A. As I recall, she was alert but sort of 
23 lethargic and feeling poorly. 
24 Q. Okay. Now you refer on the second page 
25 of your typewritten note under item number three 
r 
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1 with respect to her nutrition. You indicate that 
2 her albumen is low and total protein is low. Of 
3 what significance were those findings? 
4 A. The significance of low protein in a 
5 surgical patient is the difficulty with healing 
6 and so we started the TPN to try to increase her 
7 protein stores and increase her ability to heal. 
8 Q. And were you involved in writing the 
9 initial TPN orders? 
10 A. Idid. 
11 Q. And did you continue throughout your 
12 involvement during her hospital stay to monitor and 
13 write the TPN orders? 
14 A. Idid. 
15 Q. Okay. I don't think I was the only one 
16 who wrote them. I had a partner cover for me for 
17 the weekend and things but — 
18 Q. Would that have been Dr. Day? 
19 A. I believe it was. Again I don't have 
20 those notes here. 
21 Q. Our records seem to reflect that But 
22 as far as you know, it was you or Dr. Day or some 
23 other colleague of yours — 
24 A. I believe so. 
25 Q. - that monitored the TPN and wrote the 
1 orders for TPN. Is that yes? 
2 A. I believe so. 
3 Q. Okay. Did you have any indication at 
4 the time of your first consultation as to how long 
5 Mrs. MacLeod would have required TPN? 
6 A. No. No. At that point she'd been a 
7 week without food and didn't know exactly how long 
8 this was going to go on. 
9 Q. You indicated the second-to-last 
10 sentence on your dictated note, "As her bowels 
11 resolve, we will wean off TPN as soon as possible." 
12 A. Uh-huh. 
13 Q. Tell me what you meant by that. 
14 A. We were hoping that her intestines were 
15 able to heal and be able to take food. We try to 
16 get people on food as quickly as possible and off 
17 TPN as quickly as we can, too. 
18 Q. Are there risks associated with TPN 
19 administration? 
20 A. There are. 
21 Q. What are those? 
22 A. Most often you'll see an elevation of 
23 liver enzymes. It's usually reversible when the 
24 TPN is taken off. I've had experience through 
25 residency with people who are short gut syndrome 
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1 A. At this point — let me see here. Let 
2 me refer to her TPN orders. I don't see the date. 
3 Q. If I look at the physicians orders maybe 
4 this will help. On pages 4 and 5 there's an 
5 11-17-98 order that indicates TPN orders. There's 
6 also an order on the next day, the 18th, that 
7 indicates TPN orders. 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And then it's not until the 19th that 
10 the order indicates TPN held. 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. So at least from what we can see in the 
13 records on 11 -17-98, would that suggest that 
14 Mrs. MacLeod is still getting TPN? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. But being allowed to eat in addition. 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Okay. And I suppose at some point in 
19 time when she was eating and drinking sufficiently, 
20 the TPN would be weaned and subsequently 
21 discontinued? 
22 A, Exactly. 
23 Q. Did you have the decision making role in 
24 making that determination? 
25 A. 1 believe I was the one who ordered the 
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1 TPN to be stopped. 
2 Q. Okay. Thank you. So looking again on 
3 page 13, just so I can understand your writing, 
4 assessment, is that DM again? 
5 A. Uh-huh. ! 
6 Q. Okay. Not requiring insulin? 
7 A. Uh-huh. 
8 Q. Okay. Do you know if — did you order a 
9 sliding scale insulin -
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. - in addition to the insulin that was 
12 in the TPN? 
13 A. Originally we used a low level sliding 
14 scale insulin and then we added it to the TPN and 
15 the sliding scale was continued to be used as 
16 needed but it became less and less required. 
17 Q. Okay. Looking at number three, does 
18 that say fluid even now? 
19 A. Uh-huh. 
20 Q. Continue PO? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Okay. So insofar as retaining excess 
23 fluid it appears that she wasn't, at least as of 
j 24 the time of this examination. 
25 A. Exactly. 
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1 Q. Okay. Number four J s that PTX? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. For pneumothorax? 
4 A. Pneumothorax, yes. 
5 Q. Do you know how Mrs. MacLeod developed a 
6 pneumothorax? 
7 A. 1 believe that happened over the weekend 
8 and again we don't have the notes here from that 
9 but 1 believe they were placing a central line and 
10 she developed a pneumothorax secondary to the 
11 central line. 
12 Q. I take it that you weren't participating 
13 in any way in placement of the central line. 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Do you know if placement of the central 
16 line was necessitated for the TPN? 
17 A. Central line is required for TPN. 
18 Q. Do you know if she would have required a 
! 19 central line in the absence of needing it for TPN? 
20 A. I don't. 
21 Q. Okay. And at the time of your 
22 evaluation on the 17th of November, how did you 
23 determine that the pneumothorax was stable? 
24 A. Her saturations and oxygen were good. 
25 She wasn't complaining of shortness of breath or 
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1 having problems in any way regarding her breathing 
2 and in addition, 1 put arrow pulmonary. My 
3 intention there is to say this is being followed by 
4 the pulmonologists. 
5 Q. Okay. Do you know who the pulmonologist \\ 
6 was that was following her pneumothorax? 
7 A. 1 don't. • 
8 Q. Okay. Do you have any indication that 
9 Mrs. MacLeod suffered any permanent effects from 
10 having developed a pneumothorax during this i 
11 hospitalization? [ 
12 A, My recollection is she didn't have any • 
13 sequelae from the pneumothorax. It never became u 
14 much more of a problem after that. 
15 Q, Okay. And is it your understanding that 
16 that pneumothorax ultimately resolved and her lung 
17 reexpanded? 
18 A. That's my understanding. 
19 Q. Okay. Number TIVQ, you refer to an 
20 increased white blood count. You've got question 
21 mark, CDIF. What does it say after that? 
22 A. Check stools for toxin and culture if 
23 she has lots of stools. And then I say the rest 
24 should be covered by imipenem, which was the 
25 antibiotic she was on. 
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1 Q. Okay. 
2 A. Meaning any other infection she may have 
3 would be covered by imipenem. 
4 Q. Do you have any understanding as to 
5 whether any stool cultures came back positive for 
6 CDIF? 
7 A. My recollection is she never had large 
8 amounts of stool so we never had to check for CDIF 
9 and her white count started to come down and her 
10 abdomen improved. 
11 Q. What do you mean by her abdomen 
12 improved? 
13 A. She was able to take food. Her 
14 abdominal pain improved. She was weaned off TPN. 
15 She was tolerating PO intake well. 
16 Q. You indicated earlier that when you were 
17 first asked to consult, you consulted with respect 
18 to Mrs . MacLeod's blood sugars and then there were 
19 other matters that you took under your care, 
20 Anything in addition to what we're talking about 
21 now as far as what your role was with respect to 
22 her care? 
23 A. I'm not sure if 1 understand that 
24 question. 
25 Q. Do you recall in particular any of the 
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1 other issues that you were specifically addressing 
2 with regard to this patient as opposed to the 
3 pulmonologists or the surgeons? 
4 A . No. I helped to take care of her 
5 sugars, her nutrition status, her fluid status and 
6 that was essentially it. 
7 Q . Okay. Turning to the next page, is that 
8 your note on the top of the page next to the 1 -18? 
9 A . Yes. 
10 Q . And looking at your assessment and plan, 
] 1 were there any findings that were of concern or was 
12 Mrs. MacLeod continuing on a course that you 
13 considered to be an appropriate — 
14 A. Seems like they were improving. Sugars 
] 5 were improved. She was increasing her intake. She 
16 was fluid negative. She just looked improved. 
17 Q. You've got a reference next to number 
18 four; is that low sodium? 
19 A . Low sodium. 
20 Q. Recheck. 
21 A . Recheck. 
22 Q. Okay. Do you have any indication as to 
23 what her sodium level was on that date and what the 
24 recheck showed? 
25 A. 1 don't. The labs were pending that 
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1 morning but the morning of the 19th they came up to 
2 333 so ~ 
3 Q. And that would be a finding that would 
4 be accepted? 
5 A. Improvement. 
6 Q. Okay. Other than the weekend, you've 
7 mentioned that there was a weekend that one of your 
8 colleagues would have covered for you. Would you 
9 have gone in to see Mrs. MacLeod daily from the 
10 13th until the last day of your involvement? 
11 A. 1 believe so. 
12 Q. Okay. And we'll get to that in just a 
33 minute then. Looking to the next page, 15, is mat 
14 your note at the top of the page? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Okay. Over in the right side of the 
3 7 page there is some writing with a circle around it 
18 and then an arrow, refer to surgery. Tell me what 
3 9 that says and what the significance of that is. 
20 A. The white count continued to stay up at 
21 this point. The patient was on Primaxin, which 
22 covers a large amount of antibiotic or a large 
23 amount of infections. I wasn't sure why the white 
24 count wasn't going down and so the differential 
25 included a possible abscess. 
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1 At that point I suggested with the white 
2 count being up there was elevated alkaline 
3 phosphatase, a liver enzyme, that we could do an 
4 ultrasound versus a CAT scan versus a white blood 
5 cell scan. I deferred to surgery as I was 
6 primarily taking care of her sugars, nutrition and 
7 her fluid status and thus I suggested rather than 
8 ordered those tests. 
9 Q. Okay. D o you recall if you suggested 
10 directly to Dr. Fullmer or Dr. Kohler doing a white 
11 cell scan or ultrasound or C T or if you made your 
12 note and anticipated that they would review your 
13 note? 
14 A. I did that. I anticipated they would 
15 read my note. 
16 Q. Okay. Do you know if an abscess was 
17 ever found sometime on or after this date? 
3 8 A. Not that I'm aware of, no. 
19 Q. Okay. 
20 A. 11-19 Dr. Kohler refers, says the 
21 abscess seems unlikely, so it appears he got my 
22 message. 
23 Q. Okay. And other than the increased 
24 white count on the 19th, does Mrs. MacLeod's course 
25 with respect to your involvement appear to be 
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